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The Relevance of the Value Relevance Literature 
For Financial Accounting Standard Setting 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We evaluate the literature that, for standard-setting purposes, assesses the usefulness of 
accounting numbers on their stock market value association. For several reasons we 
conclude the literature provides little insight for standard setting. First, the association 
criterion has no theory of accounting or standard setting supporting it. Standard setters' 
descriptions of their objectives and accounting practice are both inconsistent with the 
criterion. Important forces shaping accounting standards and practice are ignored. 
Second, many tests in the literature rely on valuation models that omit important factors 
and many studies do not provide links between valuation model inputs and accounting 
numbers. Finally, there are a variety of significant econometric issues in the studies. 
 
1. Introduction 
 Over the last decade a large number of accounting papers investigate the 
empirical relation between stock market values (or changes in values) and particular 
accounting numbers for the purpose of assessing or providing a basis of assessing those 
numbers’ use or proposed use in an accounting standard.  We call the group of papers 
that are at least partially motivated by standard setting purposes, the “value-relevance” 
literature.  This paper’s objective is to critically evaluate the standard-setting inferences 
that can be drawn from these value-relevance papers.  The evaluation provides 
suggestions for future research for standard setting purposes. 
 A number of papers raise issues about the methodology used in the value-
relevance literature, particularly econometric issues (e.g., Lambert, 1996; Lys, 1996; and 
Skinner, 1996, 1999).  While we address econometric issues in this paper, we concentrate 
more on the logic and assumptions underlying the standard setting implications of the 
value-relevance papers.  The logic and assumptions imply theories of standard-setting, 
accounting and valuation.  Assessing the papers’ implications for standard-setting 
requires evaluating the descriptiveness of those theories.  Moreover, an understanding of 
these issues is necessary to address econometric issues. 
 There are other papers in the accounting literature that address the value-
relevance of accounting information without regard to standard setting.  For example, the 
capital markets literature in accounting provides evidence on topics such as the 
information content of accounting numbers and the determinants of earnings response 
coefficients.  That literature is reviewed in detail in Kothari (2001).  While we don’t 
review that literature directly, our assessments of the valuation models and the assumed 
links between the accounting numbers and the valuation models (section 5) are directly 
applicable to those papers in the capital markets literature that rely on the same models. 
 Other accounting papers address reasons various parties to standard-setting (for 
example, management) prefer particular accounting method alternatives.  Evidence from 
those papers is directly relevant to developing theories of accounting and standard setting 
of the type we discuss in sections 3 and 4.  However, the theories of accounting and 
standard setting underlying value-relevance studies generally do not incorporate factors 
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other than association with value.1   Moreover, studies of management preferences among 
accounting alternatives are part of the literature reviewed in Fields, Lys and Vincent 
(2001).  For these reasons we do not review that literature in this paper. 
 
 1.1 Types of studies 
 To facilitate our analysis we classify the value-relevance studies into three 
categories.  Other papers use a similar classification (e.g., Lambert, 1996).  Some 
individual papers fall into several categories of studies. 
i) Relative association studies compare the association between stock market 
values (or changes in values) and alternative bottom line measures.  For 
example, a study might examine whether the association of an earnings 
number, calculated under a proposed standard, is more highly associated 
with stock market values or returns (over long windows) than earnings 
calculated under existing GAAP (e.g., Dhaliwal, Subramanyam and 
Trezevant, 1999).  Other examples compare the associations of foreign 
GAAP and US GAAP earnings (e.g., Harris, Lang and Moller, 1994).  
These studies usually test for differences in the R2 of regressions using 
different bottom line accounting numbers.  The accounting number with the 
greater R2 is described as being more value-relevant.  Table 1 provides a 
partial listing of papers in the value-relevance literature classified by type of 
study performed.  Fifteen (24 percent) of the 62 papers listed in Table 1 
perform a relative association study. 
ii) Incremental association studies usually use regressions to investigate 
whether the accounting number of interest is helpful in explaining value or 
returns (over long windows) given other specified variables.  That 
accounting number is typically deemed to be value relevant if its estimated 
regression coefficient is significantly different from zero.  For example, 
Venkatachalam (1996) examines the incremental association of the fair 
value of risk management derivatives disclosed under SFAS 119 in a 
                                                 
1One of the papers listed in Table 1, Aboody and Lev (1998), investigates both value-relevance and 
management preferences.  That paper does not, however, include management preferences as a standard 
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regression of equity market value on a variety of on and off balance sheet 
items.  Some incremental association studies make additional assumptions 
about the relation between accounting numbers and inputs to a market 
valuation model in order to predict coefficient values and/or to assess 
differences in the error with which different accounting numbers measure a 
valuation input variable.  For example, Venkatachalam (1996) also tests 
whether the coefficient on the fair value of derivatives is significantly 
different from one.  Differences between the estimated and predicted values 
are often interpreted as evidence of measurement error in the accounting 
number. For that reason we call those studies measurement studies.  Fifty-
three (85 percent) of the 62 papers  in Table 1 perform an incremental 
association study.  Thirteen (25 percent) of the 53 papers perform 
measurement studies. 
iii) Marginal information content studies investigate whether a particular 
accounting number adds to the information set available to investors.  They 
typically use event studies (short window return studies) to determine if the 
release of an accounting number (conditional on other information released) 
is associated with value changes.  Price reactions would be considered 
evidence of value-relevance.  For example, Amir, Harris and Venuti (1993) 
test the marginal information content of the Form 20-F reconciliation of 
foreign and US GAAP earnings numbers for foreign firms by regressing 
five-day abnormal announcement returns on the difference and the change 
in the difference between foreign and US GAAP earnings.  Only seven (11 
percent) of the 62 papers perform an information content study. 
 Given 94 percent of value-relevance papers perform association studies (relative 
and/or incremental) while only 11 percent perform information content studies and that 
marginal information content is probably not necessary nor sufficient for standard-setting 
(see section 3), we concentrate on association studies.  Holthausen and Palepu (1994) 
contains an extensive review of marginal information content studies. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
setting criterion. 
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1.2 Standard-setting motivation 
 We rely on statements in the papers to assess whether the authors view their 
results as having implications for standard setting.  Papers that explicitly state that their 
results have such implications are included in the literature and listed in Table 1.  We find 
54 such papers.  We also include in Table 1 a small number of papers (eight) whose 
language implies (but does not explicitly state)  standard setting implications.   This latter 
determination is necessarily subjective.  Note that standard setting is not necessarily the 
sole motivation of the papers listed in Table 1 since many also contribute to the 
accounting valuation literature. 
 We quote four papers as examples of the types of statements made in this 
literature.  The first three examples have explicit standard-setting motivations (Ayers, 
1998; Barth, 1994; and Dhaliwal et al, 1999), while the fourth (Amir and Lev, 1996) is an 
example of a more implicit standard setting motivation.  Ayers (1998, p. 196) motivates 
his incremental association study as follows: 
“. . .the question of whether SFAS No. 109 provides incremental value-
relevant firm specific information is of interest for at least two related 
reasons.  First, the FASB is obligated to consider the costs and benefits of 
its standards . . . Second, the objective of accounting policy decisions is to 
produce information that is relevant and reliable (FASB 1980, SFAC 
No.2).” 
 
The motivation for Barth’s (1994, p. 1) incremental association study is also 
explicit: 
“By examining how share prices reflect historical costs and fair values, 
evidence is provided on the measures' relevance and reliability.  Because 
these are the FASB's two principal criteria for choosing among accounting 
alternatives . . . the evidence can inform the FASB’s deliberations on 
using fair value accounting for investment securities, to the extent the 
disclosed fair value estimates would be used to measure investment 
securities under fair value accounting.” 
 
Dhaliwal et al (1999, pp. 44-47) provide explicit standard setting motivation for 
their relative association study: 
“SFAS 130 is the culmination of a long-standing debate in the accounting 
profession between the ‘all-inclusive’ (or ‘comprehensive income’) and 
the ‘current operating performance’ concepts of reporting income.  This 
debate has been at the forefront of accounting-standard setting from the 
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1930s to the present. . . . This analysis allows us to draw inferences 
regarding the appropriateness of current and potential items of 
comprehensive income.  These inferences should assist the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board as it turns to the broader-scope projects 
(described in SFAS 130, paragraph 54) that will address the issue of which 
items should be included in ‘other comprehensive income.’” 
 
 In our view, the above quoted papers and the others listed in Table 1 as explicitly 
motivated by standard setting, contain direct statements of their standard setting 
motivations.  Occasionally, however, the standard-setting motivation is implicit.  For 
example, Amir and Lev (1996, p. 28) state in their conclusion: 
“The evidence presented in this study indicates that current financial 
reporting of wireless communications companies –– a large world-wide 
and technologically leading industry –– is inadequate.  Specifically, 
significant value-enhancing investments in the cellular franchise and in 
expanding the customer-base are fully expensed in financial reports, 
leading to distorted values of earnings and assets.” 
 
In this quote the description of current financial reporting as “inadequate” and generating 
“distorted” values suggests that reporting should be improved, presumably via new 
accounting standards.  In particular, Amir and Lev (p. 5) suggest capitalization of 
customer-acquisition costs in the financial statements or “clear separation between 
regular expenses and costs which potentially enhance future cash flows . . .” 
 
1.3 Theories underlying studies and inferences for standard-setting 
 Drawing standard setting inferences from the results of a value-relevance study 
requires theories of standard setting, accounting and valuation.  This may not be 
immediately obvious from many value-relevance papers, because they do not always 
fully articulate those theories.  Some authors, however, are quite explicit in laying out the 
required links necessary to draw any implications for standard setting. 
 The nature of implicit standard setting theories underlying value-relevance 
papers’ inferences can be gleaned from the experimental designs in the papers.  For 
example, as quoted earlier, Dhaliwal et al  (1999) draw inferences regarding the relative 
superiority of two alternative summary measures of income by assessing those measures’ 
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association with stock returns.2  This implies that the association between an accounting 
number and value is a factor in standard setters’ decisions on the specification of 
accounting income.  This contrasts with Barth (1994) who is explicit about the standard 
setters’ decision criteria.  Based on Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) 
No.2 she assumes the FASB’s two prime criteria for choosing among accounting 
measures are those measures’ relevance and reliability.  While her measures of relevance 
and reliability are based on associations with value, she does not assume that the 
associations themselves are of direct interest to standard setters.  
 Value-relevance papers also rely on accounting theories.  In particular, in drawing 
inferences for standard setting, most authors assume that accounting’s dominant role 
(from a standard setter’s perspective) is to provide information relevant for equity 
valuation (see Barth, 2000; and Lambert, 1996).  Other accounting functions may be 
recognized, but they are not explicitly considered in the research design. 
 Finally, valuation models or theories underlie some value-relevance papers’ 
standard setting inferences.  For example, the experimental design in Barth (1994) 
requires specific valuation models in order to generate estimates of the relevance and 
reliability of fair values of investment securities from the association between accounting 
numbers and stock prices. 
 The potential to draw standard setting inferences from value-relevance papers’ 
results depends on the descriptiveness of the underlying theories of standard setting, 
accounting and valuation.  The less descriptive the theories, the less likely standard 
setting inferences are valid.  To illustrate the importance of the descriptive ability of the 
underlying standard setting theory, consider the two examples given above.  The less the 
FASB relies on an income measure’s association with stock returns in setting accounting 
standards, the less reliable are Dhaliwal et al’s implications for the composition of 
accounting income measures.  If the concepts of relevance and reliability employed by 
Barth do not match the concepts of relevance and reliability as used by the FASB, then 
any inferences drawn about the relevance and reliability of the fair value estimates of 
investment securities in those tests are subject to question.  Since it is not obvious that the 
                                                 
2As a specification check, Dhaliwal et al  (1999)  also examine the associations between comprehensive 
income and net income with operating cash flows and net income measured one-year ahead.  Those results 
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underlying standard setting theories are descriptively accurate, assessment of the 
potential of the value-relevance literature to inform standard setting requires a 
determination of the descriptive ability of the underlying standard setting theory. 
 Standard setting inferences also depend on the underlying accounting theory’s 
descriptive ability.  It is not obvious that standard setters consider equity valuation to be 
the sole or dominant function of accounting reports.  There are other well-recognized 
functions of accounting (private contracting with its associated monitoring, regulation, 
litigation, etc.) and there is ample evidence to suggest that they influence standard setting.  
Assessment of the value-relevance’s implications for standard setting requires a 
determination of the descriptive ability of the underlying accounting theory. 
 The valuation models employed in the value-relevance literature (like all 
valuation models and theories) necessarily incorporate a number of assumptions that are 
not descriptive.  A theory is necessarily a simplified model of the world.  However, some 
of the valuation model assumptions employed seem likely to make those models 
significantly less descriptive, which potentially affects the validity of any standard setting 
inferences that could be drawn from those results.  For example, the valuation models 
used in the value-relevance literature frequently assume that firms do not earn rents, so 
that the market value of equity is equal to the market value of net assets.  That enables 
papers to predict significant positive (negative) coefficients on measures of individual 
assets (liabilities), predict the magnitude of the coefficients (under certain assumptions) 
and estimate a linear valuation equation.  However the existence of rents (and 
abandonment and expansion options) is likely, implying a non-linear valuation equation.  
In that case estimation using a linear model could generate coefficients different from 
those predicted.  The descriptive ability of the valuation theory, like the descriptive 
validity of the standard setting and accounting theories is important.   
 Note that in looking to equity market values to determine relevance, the value 
relevance literature assumes capital markets are efficient (e.g., equity prices containing 
unbiased estimates of the market values of assets and liabilities).   There is a significant 
body of literature that questions the efficiency of capital markets (see Kothari, 2001).  
Some studies make even stronger assumptions than market efficiency: the market’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
are not the primary criterion on which they draw inferences. 
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estimates are assumed not just to be unbiased but instead to be error-free (prices are not 
noisy).   
 Because many value-relevance studies do not articulate the theories underlying 
their tests and inferences, the links between the theories and accounting are not often well 
specified.  For example, rarely is the link between the accounting measure (coming out of 
some accounting theory) and a valuation variable (from a valuation model or theory) well 
specified.  Studies often employ valuation models that express the market value of equity 
as some multiple of permanent earnings and then substitute current earnings for 
permanent earnings without explaining the relation between the accounting measure and 
the valuation model input.  These ill-specified links also likely reduce the descriptive 
ability of the theories and weaken any potential standard setting inferences. 
 Given the importance of the descriptive ability of the theories underlying the 
value-relevance literature, we investigate the theories’ empirical implications and 
conclude that the theories are not very descriptive.  This raises questions regarding the 
appropriate inferences that can be drawn from this literature and the ability of the 
literature to inform standard setting.  We also explore avenues of research that we believe 
would yield additional insights about standard setting and the role of accounting. 
 While not our primary focus, many of the issues we discuss in this paper are 
important to empirical work in the capital markets literature in general, for example 
valuation research using accounting measures.  As such, some of the comments here can 
be viewed as a critique of elements of that literature as well, particularly the discussion of 
the assumed valuation models and the links between the accounting numbers and the 
models’ required inputs.  What makes the value-relevance literature different from most 
of the general capital markets literature, are the value-relevance literature’s underlying 
theories of standard-setting and accounting.  In addition, not all of the capital markets 
literature, as it is generally defined, relies on the valuation models discussed here. 
 
1.4 Outline of the paper 
 Section 2 examines value relevance papers’ stated explanations of the logic and 
assumptions underlying their empirical tests and the assumptions implicit in the empirical 
tests themselves in order to infer underlying theories of accounting and standard setting.   
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Those papers often base some of their stated assumptions about standard-setting and the 
role of accounting on FASB statements. In Section 3 it is noted that the role of 
accounting implicit in a consistent application of the value relevance tests, valuation of 
equity securities, is explicitly contradicted by SFAC No.1.   This suggests problems with 
the assumptions and logic underlying the tests’ derivation.  Three assumptions are 
identified as not following from FASB statements. We conclude that the value-relevance 
tests omit some factors that the FASB states are important for assessing whether 
information is useful and use some criteria that are contrary to FASB statements. 
 In the fourth section, we investigate whether the explicit and implicit standard 
setting and accounting theories used in the value-relevance literature can explain 
observed accounting practice.  The objective is to provide evidence on the descriptive 
ability of the literature’s underlying theories of standard setting and accounting.  We 
identify some important characteristics of current accounting practice (for example 
conservatism) that are not explained by the criteria used in the value-relevance literature.  
This raises questions about the literature’s underlying theories of standard setting and 
accounting, for example the dominance of the valuation use of accounting numbers.  We 
discuss a number of uses of accounting reports, extant in the more general accounting 
literature, that have the potential to explain characteristics of observed practice.  This is 
important because it indicates that the value-relevance literature alone is not likely to be 
very informative to the standard setting community. 
 Section 5 evaluates the valuation models used in value-relevance empirical 
studies and the links between accounting numbers and valuation model inputs.  We find 
the three basic valuation models used in the literature are appropriate only under very 
restrictive circumstances and that none of them can adequately deal with growth and 
abandonment options.  It is also important to note that none of the valuation models 
provide any role for accounting.  For example, two of the models typically used provide 
no role for components of earnings.  This lack of a role for accounting makes their use in 
assessing the desirability of alternative accounting constructs problematic.  
 Finally, section 6 offers our conclusions and suggestions for future research.  The 
main conclusion is that value-relevance tests do not incorporate, and in some instances 
conflict with, a variety of considerations involved in standard setting and the role of 
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accounting.  In other words, the theories of standard setting and accounting underlying 
the value-relevance literature are not descriptive.  This determination is based on both 
statements of the FASB and observed practice.  Even if the theories of standard-setting 
underlying the value-relevance literature were completely consistent with FASB 
statements about standard setting, the literature would still fail to meet its objectives due 
to deficiencies in the valuation models used.   Many authors in this literature offer 
appropriate caveats for some of these problems.   But, what is not often made clear is that 
the criteria underlying the value-relevance literature are quite narrow in scope, relative to 
the multiple uses of financial statements and so are unlikely to be very informative to the 
standard setting community.   
 Our discussion suggests a variety of researchable issues that could help inform 
standard setting.  One is that accounting researchers investigate the existence and strength 
of forces, other than equity valuation, that affect accounting standards and practice.  A 
more thorough understanding of those forces would make our research more useful to 
standard setters. An understanding of those forces is also important to the accounting 
valuation literature. 
 
2. The Underlying Logic and Assumptions 
 Value-relevance papers vary in the depth of their explanations of the logic and 
assumptions underlying the links between their methodology and standard-setting, 
ranging from minimal or no explanation to relatively complete explanations.  The logic 
and assumptions essentially embody theories of standard setting, accounting and 
valuation.  Below we give an example of each of the extremes of explanation, 
recognizing that many papers fall between these benchmarks. 
 Minimal or no explanation.  Many value-relevance studies provide minimal 
explanation of the logic and assumptions underlying their methodology.  Some rely on 
references to more complete explanations in papers such as Barth (1991, 1994), one of 
which is discussed below.  Others, many of them relative association studies, do not 
reference more complete explanations, nor do they provide their own logic or support for 
their assumptions.  Dhaliwal et al (1999) is an example.  Additional examples include, 
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among others, Alford, Jones, Leftwich and Zmijewski (1993), Harris, Lang and Moller 
(1994) and Harris and Muller (1999). 
 Dhaliwal et al (1999) assess whether net income or comprehensive income is a 
better measure of firm performance by comparing the two measures’ associations with 
stock returns.  The paper’s motivation (quoted previously) and its stated implications (pp. 
60-61) assume accounting standard-setters are interested in which income measure is 
most highly associated with stock market value changes.  No evidence that standard-
setters have such interest is given or referenced in the paper, and no rationale for why 
they would be interested in the results of relative association tests is discussed in the 
paper.  
 Presumably Dhaliwal et al’s rationale for comparing the explanatory power of 
income numbers is that the one with the highest association is more consistent with the 
information investors use in setting stock prices (see Lambert , 1996, p. 19). This 
conclusion is derived from the theory underlying many value-relevance studies that views 
accounting as supplying inputs to equity valuation (see Lambert, 1996; and Barth, 2000).  
Investors can use the estimated relation between stock prices and income to obtain an 
estimate of the equity value from the income number that is most highly associated.  Note 
that the mostly highly associated income number is not necessarily the most accurate 
measure of equity value.  To illustrate, assume net income is intended to measure 
permanent income (a perpetuity whose value equals the value of equity) and stock 
price/income regressions are estimated for each alternative net income measure.    Then 
the most accurate measure is the income number whose regression yields an estimated 
intercept of zero and an estimated slope coefficient of one over the discount rate (see 
Lambert, 1996, pp. 19-26). The income measure most associated with stock price could 
be one with an estimated intercept significantly different from zero and an estimated 
slope coefficient significantly different from one over the discount rate.  An estimate of 
equity value could be obtained from the most associated income number by using the 
estimated regression. 3  Choosing between the accuracy and association criteria requires 
                                                 
3 For example, suppose the R2 of a regression using earnings series 1 is 40%, the intercept is –55,001 and 
the slope coefficient is 25.25.  For earnings series 2, assume the R2 of the series is 36%, the intercept is zero 
and the slope coefficient is 10, exactly equal to the predicted value of the coefficient of permanent income, 
one over the discount rate (10%).  Furthermore, assume the 4% difference in the R2 is statistically 
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an accounting and standard setting theory.  If the FASB is interested in investors being 
able to use the information to generate their own estimates of value, association is the 
appropriate test.  If the FASB is interested in income measuring value, accuracy might be 
the appropriate test.  Without a theory of accounting and standard setting, one cannot 
determine which is the appropriate criterion. 
 Pursuing the objective of maximizing association would lead to income being 
highly associated with value or changes in value.  While this is motivated by an input to 
valuation argument, it will in practice lead to an income number that is a linear 
transformation of value itself.  This hardly seems consistent with an input to valuation 
view of accounting. Dhaliwal et al argue they are merely testing claims of various parties 
who argue over whether net income or comprehensive income is a better summary 
measure of performance.  But, as indicated above, is a “better summary measure of 
performance” one that more accurately measures permanent income or one that is more 
highly associated with changes in value?  They judge the quality of alternative summary 
measures primarily by mere association with changes in equity value. Note that the 
reliance on aggregate changes in value means Dhaliwal et al do not have to specify a 
valuation model. 
 Relatively complete explanation.  Some of the incremental association studies 
have more complete explanations of their underlying logic and assumptions, though again 
there are large differences across studies.  Many, as suggested in the earlier Ayers quote, 
link an accounting measure’s incremental value-relevance to the concepts of relevance 
and reliability, which are explicitly discussed by the FASB as being important 
characteristics of accounting information. 
 The Barth (1994) incremental association study provides one of the most 
complete explanations for the logic and assumptions underlying a value-relevance study.  
As we have noted, Barth’s underlying standard setting theory relies on standard-setters’ 
statements about the criteria for choice among accounting alternatives.  In particular, 
                                                                                                                                                 
significantly at the 5% level.  How would the FASB consider the tradeoff of explanatory power versus 
accuracy?  Earnings series 1 clearly has the greater explanatory power and would be pronounced “the 
winner” in a relative association test study.  In order to estimate equity value from earnings series 1, one 
would scale the earnings series by an appropriate factor and adjust for the intercept.  Earnings series 2, 
despite its slightly lower explanatory power, closely approximates permanent income and estimated value is 
the earnings multiplied by 10. 
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based on SFAC No.2, she assumes the FASB’s two prime criteria for choosing among 
accounting alternatives are the comparative relevance and reliability of the alternative 
measures.  Her objective in the paper is to compare the relevance and reliability of fair 
market value and historical cost measures of the value and change in value of investment 
securities held by banks.  Barth (2000,p.16) states that “relevance refers to the ability of 
the item to make a difference to decisions of financial statement users” and “reliability 
refers to the ability of the measure to represent what it purports to represent.”  The 
relevance definition is consistent with SFAC No.2 paragraph 47.  The reliability 
definition is roughly consistent with SFAC No.2 paragraph 59 except that it makes no 
mention of verification.  Paragraph 59 states “the reliability of a measure rests on the 
faithfulness with which it represents what it purports to represent, coupled with an 
assurance for the user, which comes through verification , that it has representational 
quality.”  As we shall see verifiability  can be important and might not be reflected in 
incremental association. 
 The links articulated in Barth (1994) including the measurement error model of 
Section V (pp. 20 – 23) employs a variation of the methodology in Barth (1991) that is 
found in varying degrees in other value-relevance papers.  A comparison of the 
differences in the relevance and reliability of different accounting measures requires a 
benchmark of the variable being measured, the “true” value of investment securities and 
the true gain and loss on those securities.  To achieve this, Barth uses the asset value of 
investment securities implicit in the stock price:  “The approach views accounting 
measures as variables measured with error and the amounts implicit in share prices as 
‘true’ variables.”  (Barth, 1994, p. 20).  The assumption that the amounts in share prices 
are the “true” variables is stronger than market efficiency: the market’s estimates are not 
just unbiased they error-free. The comparison of accounting numbers to variables implicit 
in stock prices implies accounting provides measures of variables that are inputs to 
valuation.  
 Comparison of “true” asset values implicit in share prices with accounting 
measures of those values requires the assumption of a particular stock market valuation 
model.  Barth assumes three stock market valuation models; one for the market value of 
equity used in evaluating the relevance and reliability of measures of the asset’s value, 
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and two for changes in value or stock returns used in evaluating changes in the asset’s 
value.  In all the valuation models, the “true” value of the investment securities is the 
asset’s market value implicit in the market value of the equity. 
 Barth uses a variety of regression specifications to simultaneously determine the 
“true value” of the investment securities implicit in price as well as to assess the 
relevance and reliability of the alternative accounting measures.  To illustrate Barth’s 
logic with minimal investment and no loss of explanatory power, we use only one of her 
specifications.  The specification includes a single accounting measure of the value of 
investment securities, fair value.  In that specification, stock market values are regressed 
on investment securities’ fair value and the book value of equity before investment 
securities.  The same model is also run where historical cost measures of investment 
securities are substituted for the fair value measures. 
 The relevance and reliability of a fair value measure are inferred from the 
significance of the fair value measure’s estimated regression coefficient.  Based on her 
assumed valuation models, Barth argues (p. 7) the estimated coefficient on the fair value 
of investment securities should be one.  As Barth recognizes, this requires; (1) the 
valuation models be correct; (2) all the accounting measures equal the value of their 
relevant variables in the valuation models (there is no measurement error or bias); and (3) 
the measures of all the variables in the valuation models be included (no correlated 
omitted variables).  If fair value measures the asset’s market value with sufficient error or 
bias, the estimated coefficient could be other than one and potentially insignificant.  
 Barth argues that a significant incremental association with the implicit market 
value of investment securities indicates the fair value of investment securities is used as 
an estimate of an input into an equity valuation model, which in turn implies it is relevant 
to some business decisions.  The finding that the measurement error is insufficient to 
generate insignificance suggests that the measure is at least somewhat reliable.4 
                                                 
4These conclusions assume there are no correlated omitted variables and that the accounting measures of 
assets and liabilities other than non-investment securities have no measurement error .  Barth recognizes 
that, if some valuation variables are omitted from the regression, the significance of the fair value 
measure’s coefficient could be due to correlation between the fair value measure and the omitted variables 
rather than to the relevance and reliability of the fair value measure.  She also allows for measurement error 
in the historical cost and fair value variables in her tests, by imposing a specific structure for the 
measurement error.  In addition, she attemp ts to discriminate between a measurement error and correlated 
omitted variables explanation for her finding that the fair values of assets are highly correlated with the 
7:57 AM                     10/6/2000                                                   15 
 
 
 The discussion of the Barth (1994) paper clearly demonstrates the theories and 
assumptions necessary to draw standard setting inferences from her tests.  Among the 
necessary conditions for drawing any type of inference on whether the fair value of 
investment securities should be included in the balance sheet are the following.  First, any 
inference requires the FASB be concerned about the extent to which investment 
securities’ fair value estimates measure their “true” market values (e.g. the extent of bias 
and measurement error) as a precondition for recognition in the balance sheet.  Thus, 
implicit here is a theory of standard setting and the role of accounting.  Second, it 
requires the market valuation model be descriptive (e.g., in the levels model, it is 
assumed that the market value of equity approximately equals the market value of the 
separable net assets).  Thus, this presumes the valuation model is appropriate and 
observed equity prices are not very noisy estimates of “true value” of the common equity.  
Third, it requires the book value of net assets (other than investment securities) measure 
the market value of those net assets without bias and or measurement error (or that 
somehow, the tests control for those problems).  Fourth, it requires no correlated omitted 
variables. 
 Between the extremes of the Dhaliwal et al (1999) and the Barth (1994) papers lie 
a wide range of explanations of the standard setting and accounting theories underlying 
the associations estimated and the standard setting inferences generated.  Regardless of 
the completeness of their explanation, all of the value-relevance papers assume the 
primary purpose of financial reporting (financial statements and disclosures) is to provide 
information to investors for use in assessing the value of the firm for investment decision 
purposes.  This assumption seems to be made both as a description of accounting practice 
as part of an accounting theory and as a description of the objective pursued by 
accounting standard setters as part of a standard setting theory.  Barth (2000, p. 10) states  
“Investors represent a large class of financial statement users and thus much academic 
research addressing financial reporting issues relevant to practicing accountants, 
particularly standard setters, adopts an investor perspective . . . investors are primarily 
                                                                                                                                                 
market value of equity, but that the fair value of security gains and losses is not related to returns, 
ultimately favoring a measurement error explanation. 
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interested in information that can help them assess the value of the firm for purposes of 
making informed investment choices.” 
 Value-relevance studies determine whether an accounting number is useful for 
valuing the firm by investigating whether the accounting number is associated with stock 
prices.  As we have seen, relative association studies test the relative usefulness of 
alternative financial statement bottom line numbers.  Incremental association studies test 
the usefulness of individual financial statement components or disclosures.  As noted in 
discussing the Dhaliwhal et al  explanation,  the relative association test implies that 
income numbers can be transformed into estimates of the equity value or change in value.   
Incremental association study tests are supposed to indicate the usefulness of accounting 
measures as inputs to valuation.  However, the distinction between the two interpretations 
is more cosmetic than real.  To see this consider what would happen if the FASB literally 
followed the standard setting inferences made from incremental association studies and 
did not consider any other factors. 
 Consider studies involving balance sheet components and using the balance sheet 
valuation model described in Barth (1994) (i.e., the market value of equity equals the 
market value of net assets). Assume the incremental studies solve all the problems 
identified earlier: the valuation model is descriptive, the problems of bias and 
measurement error in the variables are controlled and there are no correlated omitted 
variables.  Suppose the FASB embarked on a program of conducting incremental 
association studies on all assets and liabilities one at a time.5  First, assume they select the 
accounting measure for each asset or liability that has the highest incremental association 
with equity market value.  If the program were successful the net asset value would be 
                                                 
5 The value relevance literature seems to be expanding to cover a wide range of assets, liabilities and 
earnings components.  It is not restricted to assets such as investment securities where the circumstances 
are more suitable for studies such as Barth (1994).  Nine of the papers  listed in Table 1 study investment 
securities, but 57 papers study other accounting topics (the numbers add to more than 62 because  some 
papers study multiple accounting topics).  The numbers of studies on various issues are: eight on intangible 
assets (including software development, brand names, development expense, goodwill, patents and research 
and development); five on other asset valuation (current cost, property, oil and gas reserves and 
acquisitions); 17 on liabilities (pensions, post-retirement benefits other than pensions, environmental 
liabilities, deferred taxes and stock options); eight on various performance measures (earnings components, 
various EPS measures, economic value added, cash flow alternatives, comprehensive income and 
alternative real estate investment trust measures); two on foreign income and exchange gains and losses; 15 
incremental and relative association studies on different countries’  accounting methods; one on intemporal 
value relevance; and one on fundamental analysis. 
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highly associated with the market value of equity.  Since the book value of net assets is 
the book value of equity, this program would be similar to a program aimed at selecting 
alternative book values of equity based on their relative association with the market value 
of equity.  The incremental association program would end up with a book value of 
equity that is a transformation of the market value of equity.  Now assume the FASB 
adopts a measurement approach and selects the accounting measure for each asset or 
liability that measures the market value of that asset or liability with least error.  If the 
program was very successful, each asset and liability measure would approximate its 
market value and the book value of equity would approximate the market value of equity.  
Given the valuation model, a standard setting program based on measurement or 
incremental association would end up providing equity value estimates directly or 
measures that could be transformed into equity value estimates.  The same point could be 
made for a program of measurement or incremental studies studies on earnings 
components using a given earnings valuation model: earnings would become an estimate 
of equity value or the change in equity value, depending on the chosen valuation model, 
or a measure that could be transformed into an equity value estimate. 
 Most value-relevance researchers likely do not believe that either the book value 
of equity or earnings should be an estimate of equity market value or a measure that can 
be transformed into an estimate of equity market value. Many are careful to indicate that 
they are only providing information to standard setters that the standard setters can weigh 
along with other relevant factors (see Barth, 2000, pp. 8-9), that they are merely assessing 
the relevance and reliability of alternative accounting estimates, or that they are testing 
the claims of various parties about the properties of alternative accounting estimates.  
But, the other factors’ nature and trade-off with value relevance are not discussed in the 
literature. Thus, the validity of any standard setting inferences drawn from this literature, 
or the extent to which this literature can inform standard setters, depends positively on 
the extent to which accounting is concerned with equity valuation and providing 
estimates of equity values, and negatively on the extent to which accounting plays other 
important roles.  
 The underlying premise in the value-relevance literature is that accounting’s 
primary or dominant role is the valuation of equity securities.  To the extent accounting 
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has other roles, the value-relevance literature’s lack of consideration of those roles 
assumes an accounting measure’s usefulness in other roles is captured by its association 
with equity valuations.  In this paper we refer to this underlying assumption of the 
literature as the value-relevance criterion. 
 
3. FASB Statements and Value-Relevance Theories 
 In the previous section we argue the value relevance literature’s tests imply 
accounting’s role is equity valuation and that accounting fulfils that role by providing 
estimates of value or transformations of value.  In deriving their tests, value relevance 
researchers often rely on some FASB statements about the nature of accounting and 
standard setting.   Our first point in this section is that other FASB statements explicitly 
contradict the implication that the FASB intends accounting to provide estimates of 
equity valuation.  Assuming FASB statements are consistent, we compare assumptions 
made in deriving value relevance tests to FASB statements and ask what assumptions are 
made that could lead to that contradiction.   The first assumption we identify is that the 
FASB considers users other than equity investors and uses other than valuation of equity 
securities in determining accounting standards. Indeed, FASB statements do not imply 
the FASB regards provision of inputs to equity valuation as the sole, or even dominant, 
function of financial statements let alone that equity valuation is accounting’s role.  Thus, 
relevance do not require an accounting measure to be a measure of an equity valuation 
model input.   The second assumption made in the value relevance literature that we 
identify as not implied by FASB statements is the assumption that stock prices 
adequately represent equity investors’ use of information in valuing equity securities.  
The third assumption we identify is that the tests of relevance and reliability teased from 
stock prices do not necessarily reflect reliability as defined by FASB statements.   
 In reaching the above conclusions, we assume the FASB’s stated position predicts 
their standard setting actions or indicates the actions they take if unconstrained by other 
factors (e.g., cost).  Of course, it is possible that the FASB’s actions deviate from their 
stated position, so in the following section we also examine whether the properties of 
financial statements are consistent with the implicit standard setting and accounting 
theories underlying the value-relevance literature. 
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3.1 FASB statements and the value-relevance criterion 
 The FASB explicitly denies that financial accounting’s objective is to value 
equity:  “information (provided by financial reports) may help those who desire to 
estimate the value of a business enterprise, but financial accounting is not designed to 
measure directly the value of an enterprise.” (SFAC No. 1, paragraph 41). 
 The FASB statement’s denial of a direct valuation role for accounting suggests 
there are factors apart from the value-relevance criterion that enter into the determination 
of accounting and its standards; factors that cannot be captured by that criterion.  These 
factors prevent accounting standard setters from adopting accounting standards that value 
equity directly.  A comparison of the assumptions of the theories underlying the value-
relevance literature with FASB statements, can help us identify factors that impact 
accounting and its standards but which are misstated in, or missing from, the value-
relevance literature.  This serves two roles.  First, it helps identify why the value-
relevance literature is likely to have a limited impact on standard setting.  Second, it 
yields some interesting research questions that might provide additional relevant 
information to standard setters, while at the same time improving our understanding of 
the theory of accounting.  
 
3.2 FASB statements and assumptions underlying value-relevance 
 Examples of assumptions in the theory underlying the value-relevance literature 
that are not consistent with FASB statements are discussed below.  We focus on 
assumptions about the users and uses of financial reporting, the reflection of individual 
decisions in the aggregate market as reflected by the stock price and the definition of 
reliability. 
 
3.2.1 Users and uses 
 Based on SFAC No.1 and the FASB’s mission statement, value-relevance papers 
assume the objective of financial reporting is to provide information useful in making 
business and economic decisions.  As we noted in the previous section, the value-
relevance literature assumes investors are the users of accounting numbers and their 
7:57 AM                     10/6/2000                                                   20 
 
 
prime use is in valuing firms for investment decision purposes (see Lambert, 1996, p. 6; 
and Barth, 2000, p. 10).  Since all of the empirical work in the literature involves equity 
values, in practice “investors” has come to mean equity investors. 
 The value-relevance literature’s assumptions about the users and uses of financial 
reporting are not representative of FASB statements about users and uses.  The FASB 
includes among its definition of users individuals who are not primarily interested in 
equity valuation including some that may not be interested in valuing any of the firms 
securities.  The FASB considers external investors and creditors to be users of 
information provided by financial reporting (SFAC No.1, paragraphs 30 and 35).  The 
terms “investor” and “creditor” are broadly defined to include actual and potential 
holders of equity and debt securities, trade creditors, customers and employees with 
claims, lending institutions, and individual lenders. 
 The FASB statements about the uses of financial reporting do not suggest any 
primacy for equity valuation.  The FASB describes financial statements as general-
purpose statements that provide inputs to a range of different decisions that have 
generally similar (but not identical) information demands (see SFAC No. 5, paragraphs 
15 and 16).  Some of those decisions involve valuation.  For example, the FASB’s 
concern with users assessing cash receipts from dividends or interest and proceeds from 
sale, redemption or maturity of securities or loans (SFAC No.1, paragraph 37) suggests it 
is concerned with the valuation use of financial reports.  Other statements, however, 
suggest many uses that need not involve equity valuation.  For example, SFAC No. 1, 
paragraph 49 suggests a concern with demands by lenders for assessing whether the firm 
is in financial difficulty, for assessing liquidity and solvency. Accounting ratios that 
measure solvency and liquidity are used in monitoring debt contracts (see Holthausen, 
1981; Leftwich, 1981; Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983; and Sweeney, 1994).  When these 
ratios reach their specified values they generate an investigation of the borrower’s 
solvency.  The FASB also explicitly recognizes management stewardship and corporate 
governance users of financial reporting (SFAC No. 1 paragraphs 50-53). 
 The FASB’s listing of broad ranges of users and uses and its emphasis that as a 
consequence financial statements are general purpose statements strongly suggest the 
assumption that financial reporting and financial statements are primarily aimed at equity 
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investors and equity valuation is not descriptive.  Moreover, it suggests that those 
different uses are not served by the same information that an equity investor might 
choose. 
 Implications for value-relevance literature.  Equity value-relevance is not a 
necessary condition for standard setting given the FASB’s broad definition of users and 
uses.  For example, creditors and lenders are more interested in valuing a firm’s debt and 
default probability than in valuing the firm’s shares.  Given the value-relevance rationale, 
this suggests that studies using loan values might provide different results to studies using 
equity values.  It is not apparent that the relevance of a given number would be the same 
for equity investors and lenders.  For example, variables that provide information about 
the value of a loan, bond, or an accounts receivable if the firm defaults, may not explain 
cross-sectional variation in equity values for a sample of firms where the liquidation 
probability is low.  The value of future growth options in the event of a firm’s success are 
likely to be more relevant to equity investors than to lenders, bond investors or creditors.  
If the firm is successful, the individual creditor is paid the face value of the debt and 
doesn’t have any claim on the growth options that result from the success.  This is 
important because it implies that there is no absolute construct of relevance and reliability 
that can be gleaned from association with equity values.  What is relevant for one user or 
user group, may not be relevant for another.  Relevance and reliability as assessed from a 
lender’s perspective may be quite different from that of an equity investor. 
 We do not observe any value-relevance studies using bond, loan or debt values as 
the dependent variable, perhaps because those values are less readily available.  
However, even if a researcher were to conduct a study using bond or loan values, it 
would still be important to design a study that would have the power to detect the 
relevance of default information for valuing bonds or loans.  In particular, it may be 
necessary to use a sample of firms where the probability of default is substantial. 
 
3.2.2 Stock prices and individual investors’ use of information 
 As Lambert (1996, pp. 6-7) points out, the value-relevance literature uses stock 
prices to assess investors’ use of financial reporting information because those prices 
“represent the aggregation of individual investors’ valuations of the firm and the 
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information upon which that valuation is based.”  The use of this aggregate measure 
narrows the scope of equity investors’ information demands from that expressed in the 
FASB’s statements.  From its statements, the FASB is interested in individual investors, 
not investors in the aggregate as represented by the stock market.  This interest could be 
due to concerns about unequal access to information and different costs of information 
acquisition.  The FASB (SFAC No.1, paragraph 28) states that the objectives of financial 
reporting “stem primarily from the informational needs of external users who lack the 
authority to prescribe the financial information they want from an enterprise and 
therefore must use the information that management communicates to them.” 
 Since stock market prices incorporate more information than that available to any 
single investor or his advisor, no investor likely has all the information that is 
incorporated in prices.  Similarly, and perhaps as a result, individual investor valuation 
models and hence demand for inputs to those models can vary substantially in the cross-
section in a way not reflected in the market price.  In addition, few individuals may be 
aware of information at the time it is incorporated into stock prices, so information can be 
timely for many investors when it is not timely for the market in aggregate.  The FASB 
considers timeliness critical for information to be relevant (SFAC No.2, paragraph 56), 
and defines it as “having information available to a decision maker before it loses its 
capacity to influence decisions (emphasis added).”  For this reason the FASB could be 
interested in including information in accounting statements of a period later than the 
period in which it is reflected in the stock price.  This would be particularly true if a 
reliable measure of the information could not be obtained at the time the market 
incorporated the information (because of verification difficulties –– see below).  
 Implications for value-relevance literature.  The virtually exclusive reliance on 
stock market data in relative and incremental association studies raises issues regarding 
whether value-relevance studies can appropriately capture the demands of individual 
investors.  
 
3.2.3 Reliability and verifiability 
 As we noted in section 2, a significant incremental association (as reflected in a 
significant coefficient on the accounting number of interest) is interpreted as evidence 
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that the accounting number meets the FASB’s two prime criteria of relevance and 
reliability.  Reliability is interpreted in terms of measurement error.  Barth (2000, p. 16) 
puts it as follows: 
“Value-relevant means the accounting amount is associated with some 
measure of value, e.g., share prices.  If the amount significantly increases 
the power of the estimating equation to explain equity value, then it must 
be relevant and measured with at least some reliability.  If it is not relevant 
there would be no relation with equity value.  If the amount is fraught with 
‘too much’ measurement error, the researcher also would not detect a 
significant relation.” 
 
 However, there is an attribute of the FASB definition of reliability that may not be 
reflected in the significance of the estimated relation.  That attribute is verifiability.  As a 
result significant incremental association does not necessarily imply the number under 
consideration is reliable. 
 Verifiability is  
“the ability through consensus among measurers to ensure that 
information represents what it purports to represent or that the chosen 
method of measurement has been used without error or bias.” (SFAC No. 
2). 
 
 SFAC No. 2 also states: 
“the quality of verifiability contributes to the usefulness of accounting 
information because the purpose of verification is to provide a significant 
degree of assurance that accounting measures represent what they purport 
to represent.  Verification is more successful in minimizing measurer bias 
than measurement bias and thus contributes in varying degrees toward 
assuring that particular measures represent faithfully the economic things 
or events that they purport to represent . . . ” (paragraph 81) and 
 
“Measurer bias is a less complex concept than measurement bias.  In its 
simplest form, it arises from intentional misrepresentation.  But even 
honest measurers may get different results from applying the same 
measurement method, especially if it involves a prediction of the outcome 
of a future event, such as the realization of an asset.  Measurer bias can be 
detected and eliminated by having the measurement repeated with the 
same results . . .” (paragraph 82) 
 
 Verification is concerned with preventing misrepresentation.  Misrepresentation 
in financial statements occurs because the management responsible for preparing the 
statements has better information than the auditor and the investors and has an incentive 
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to misrepresent.  There is an information asymmetry and an agency problem.  For 
example, management’s incentives to misrepresent may stem from the fact they are 
evaluated and compensated on accounting performance measures from the published 
audited financial statements to which FASB standards apply.  In addition, management is 
often evaluated and compensated on the basis of the firm’s stock price, which may be 
temporarily influenced by misstatement.  Note management’s incentive is not necessarily 
always to bias performance measures upward, in some cases they have incentives to bias 
downward (e.g., bonus plans can provide such an incentive, see Healy, 1985).  
Management also has incentives to bias accounting numbers because of debt contracts 
that use audited published financial statements (see Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).  Note 
also that in order to mislead auditors and the stock market about their manipulation, 
management may introduce noise as well as bias. 
 Assuming efficient markets, measurement method and measurer errors and biases 
will be reflected in the value-relevance of accounting numbers.  For example, an 
incremental association study’s coefficients’ magnitudes and signs can be affected.  
Biases will affect the magnitudes since the coefficients will reflect them.  Measurement 
errors can affect the magnitudes and signs with the effect depending on the correlation 
structure among the true values of the independent variables and the measurement errors 
(see Barth, 1991; and Lambert, 1996).  If management incentives to bias and introduce 
measurement error are present, lack of verifiability will affect the reliability and the 
value-relevance of the accounting numbers. 
 Implications for value-relevance literature.  Identifying potential verifiability 
difficulties is likely to be a serious problem when value-relevance researchers are 
evaluating accounting numbers or methods that are not currently included in GAAP and 
so are not currently reflected in actual financial statements used in compensation 
contracts, debts contracts, etc.  The estimated accounting numbers used in the research 
have to be estimated (e.g., the environmental liability estimates of Barth and McNichols, 
1994) or obtained from existing disclosures in footnotes or other sources (e.g., Barth, 
1994), or directly from firms (as in the case of other post-retirement benefits).  Such 
estimates or disclosures, even if produced by management prior to their forced 
recognition, could be relatively free from bias and noise because the managers’ 
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incentives to bias and include measurement error are not as strong.  In that case, the 
coefficients and their significance would not be affected by the lack of verifiability.  
However, once the numbers are included in the financial statements, the incentive to 
misrepresent increases and if the numbers are not verifiable they could become useless 
for decision-making and unrelated to stock price.  Failure to consider the potential 
verifiability of the numbers in value-relevance studies could lead to misleading results 
even ignoring the other problems raised in this section. 
 An accounting number that is value relevant in a study before it becomes part of 
GAAP could well cease to be value relevant after it becomes part of GAAP, if it is not 
verifiable.  Standard setters must address issues of this type in their determination of 
accounting standards.  Thus a finding of value-relevance is not a sufficient condition for 
an accounting standard. 
 The verification aspect of financial statements may perform an important role in 
generating more timely credible voluntary disclosures by firms, disclosures that make 
required disclosures less timely in the sense of conveying information to the market in 
aggregate.  Management’s knowledge that the effect of events disclosed will be reflected 
in the near future in audited financial statements or required disclosures controls 
management’s incentives to issue misleading voluntary disclosures making those 
disclosures more credible.  This reinforces the point made earlier that marginal 
information content is unlikely to be a necessary condition for standard setting.  If the 
required audited number was not reported because it had no marginal information 
content, the pre-empting voluntary disclosure may no longer be credible and may lose its 
marginal information content.  An important function of audited financial statements may 
be in supplying credibility to other disclosures and information. 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
 We have observed that for multiple reasons, value-relevance, as defined in the 
literature, is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for standard setting given the 
FASB statements about how it sets standards.  The FASB’s statements imply that it is 
concerned with a multitude of users, uses and financial accounting attributes in the 
determination of standards.  The many other uses and requirements of accounting 
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potentially limit the impact of the value-relevance literature on standard setting.  
However, as social scientists, we should not just accept what the FASB says it does, we 
should also investigate what the FASB does.  The next section investigates whether the 
value-relevance literature plays a central role in explaining FASB actions as reflected in 
accounting practice and the extent to which commonly observed attributes of accounting 
information are inconsistent with the value-relevance criterion.  Of course, accounting 
practice not only depends on the FASB actions, but also on the implementation of GAAP, 
which in turn depends on preparers, auditors and the SEC. 
 
 
4. Value-Relevance and GAAP 
 Although the value-relevance criterion is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
standard setting given the FASB’s description of standard setting, it might describe the 
way the FASB behaves.  More broadly, perhaps it describes GAAP and the accounting 
that we observe in practice.  Does the observed association between earnings and stock 
prices suggest GAAP is created to maximize that association, or that changes in GAAP 
are attempts to increase that association?  Does the nature and evolution of 
contemporaneous balance sheets suggest GAAP is designed to equate the book value of 
equity with the market value of the equity?  This section asks those questions and 
concludes that in practice GAAP does not value the equity in the balance sheet or report 
earnings that attempt to measure value changes or value levels.  Nor does GAAP try to 
estimate transformations of value or value changes.  In practice, as in the FASB 
statements, the income statement and balance sheet are asked to serve multiple functions 
and non-valuation functions have important implications for the form and content of 
those statements.  
 The above conclusion is important because the value-relevance criterion implies 
that accounting’s fundamental role is to measure or help to measure market value and the 
value-relevance literature ignores other forces affecting the form and content of financial 
statements.  To the extent those other forces are pervasive, the usefulness of the value-
relevance research is diminished.  While authors of value-relevance studies may not 
claim the value-relevance criterion is the only criterion for standards, the accounting 
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literature’s concentration on that criterion impedes the development of a descriptive 
theory that is useful to standard setters.  Development of a theory that explains all the 
factors important for the determination of accounting standards and the conditions under 
which they are more or less powerful, would be a substantive addition to the accounting 
literature. 
 To gain insights into why the balance sheet and earnings are not simply measures 
of value (or transformations of estimates of value) we identify some characteristics of the 
income statement and balance sheet that are inconsistent with, or are not explained by, 
the valuation criterion and investigate alternative explanations for those characteristics.  
In some of those cases the characteristics are consistent with financial statements 
providing inputs to investors’ decision models that involve valuation.  For example, the 
contents of the balance sheet are consistent with the balance sheet being an input to 
valuation (as described by the FASB), but are inconsistent with it being an estimate of 
value itself. 
 In other cases, the identified characteristics are not explained by either the 
literature’s position that the predominant function of financial statements is to provide 
inputs to valuation or the value-relevance criterion.  For example, there is evidence not 
only that financial statements prepared under US GAAP exhibit significant conservatism 
(e.g., Basu, 1997; and Ball, Kothari and Robin, 1999), but also that the exhibited 
conservatism increased under formal standard-setting regimes, particularly that of the 
FASB (see Basu, 1997; Givoly and Hayn, 2000; and evidence reported later in this 
paper).  Four non-mutually exclusive hypotheses that could explain conservatism and its 
increase are considered:  litigation, contracting, political and tax considerations.  All four 
hypotheses are consistent with some casual and/or formal evidence.  The section 
concludes by investigating the mechanisms by which litigation, contracting and tax could 
influence standard setting. 
 
4.1 The nature and evolution of the balance sheet 
 The nature of the balance sheet and its evolution over time are inconsistent with 
the balance sheet’s role being to value the firm or equity.  The nature and evolution of the 
balance sheet are consistent with the provision of inputs to valuation being one of the 
7:57 AM                     10/6/2000                                                   28 
 
 
balance sheet’s multiple functions.   That evidence is consistent with contracting being 
another of those multiple roles.  Finally, the evidence suggests litigation and political 
considerations influence the form and content of the balance sheet. 
 
4.1.1 The nature of the balance sheet 
 The balance sheet today still consists mostly of individual, separable assets and 
liabilities just as it did prior to the Securities Acts.  The FASB’s reintroduction of market 
value accounting is for individual assets, not for the firm.6  There is no attempt to value 
the firm or equity directly in the statement of financial position.  The valuation of 
individual assets is consistent with the balance sheet providing an estimate of the market 
value of net assets.  However, the market value of net assets is only one ingredient to 
valuation, and generally, equity valuation would additionally require valuation of the 
firm’s future cash flows (see next section).  The general nature of the balance sheet is 
more consistent with several alternative hypotheses about its function than with direct 
equity or firm valuation.  For example, the balance sheet’s nature seems more consistent 
with it providing an input to firm and loan valuation, in particular the value of the 
abandonment option, as opposed to valuation of the firm or equity directly. 
 The view that the book values of assets are estimates of their separable market 
values is also consistent with another non-mutually exclusive hypothesis about the role of 
accounting –– the contracting role of audited financial statements.  For example, debt 
contracts use book values of assets and liabilities as estimates of the resources and debt 
claims of the firm to trigger covenants that restrict management actions that reduce firm 
and debt value (see Smith and Warner, 1979; and Leftwich, 1983). 
 The treatment of goodwill in practice provides insights into whether the balance 
sheet is intended to measure the value of the firm.  Goodwill represents the difference 
between the market value of the firm and net assets (as well as omitted assets).  It is 
recorded only if purchase accounting is used, and if recorded, is amortized.  This 
treatment is inconsistent with standard setters pursuing a value-relevance criterion in an 
                                                 
6Individual assets were occasionally revalued to market prior to the SEC, often prior to new financing (see 
Finney, 1935, chapter 40).  Also, revaluations of individual assets continue to occur today in other Anglo-
American accounting countries. 
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unconstrained manner, since goodwill is not revised periodically to make equity equal to 
firm value.   
 The recording of goodwill at all seems inconsistent with debt-contracting since 
debt agreements use the reported financial statements but generally exclude goodwill and 
intangibles (see Leftwich, 1983).  This inconsistency could be due to other factors. 7   
Prior to the SEC, goodwill was often written down to a nominal amount (see Ely and 
Waymire, 1999a, p. 15) with a write-off against equity (a practice that was common in 
the UK until recently).  This practice is consistent with debt contracting.  Debt-contracts 
likely excluded goodwill from the balance sheets because in liquidation, goodwill would 
presumably be zero (continuing the firm would not be a positive net present value 
project). 
 Another contracting role of the balance sheet relates to executive compensation 
contracts.  Some executive compensation contracts use the book value of assets or equity 
to assess whether the firm earns a return above a normal rate of return on the firm’s assets 
or net assets (see Smith and Watts, 1982; Healy, 1985; and Holthausen, Larcker and 
Sloan, 1995).  Such use is appropriate if the book value of assets is an estimate of the 
market value of the separable assets or the book value of the equity is an estimate of 
market value of the separable assets, net of liabilities.  This view of the balance sheet is 
supported by the FASB’s description of the complementarities of the balance sheet and 
the statements of earnings and comprehensive income: 
 “Statements of earnings and comprehensive income generally reflect a 
great deal about the profitability of an entity during a period, but that 
information can be interpreted most meaningfully or compared with that 
of the entity for other periods or that of other entities only if it is used in 
conjunction with a statement of financial position, for example, by 
computing rates of return on assets or equity.” (SFAC No. 5, paragraph 
                                                 
7An interesting issue is why didn’t firms immediately write-off goodwill.  The answer likely has to do with 
the effects of such a write-off on the firm.  Many large US industrial firms formed by mergers of existing 
firms around 1900 had the par value of their shares considerably higher than the tangible book value of the 
merged firms.  The alternative for these firms was to record the difference between par and tangible values 
as a discount on issue, a number that would have to be eliminated via profits before dividends could be paid 
(see Ely and Waymire, 1999a, p. 13).  Writing off goodwill would have imposed the same dividend 
constraint on the firm.  By the late 1920’s it appears that most of these firms had been able to write off 
these intangible assets.  It would be interesting to investigate the firms that had capitalized goodwill in the 
1920s to determine if the failure to write-off goodwill was associated with similar constraints on dividends 
or financial policy (by then states had revised their laws that required large par values).  The explanation 
for the capitalization of purchased goodwill today could well lie in related constraints on firms. 
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4.1.2 The evolution of the balance sheet 
 The evolution of the balance sheet in the US is not only consistent with the 
balance sheet providing an input to valuation and to contracting, it suggests political and 
litigation considerations play a role in shaping the form and content of the balance sheet.  
Prior to the creation of the SEC and formal standard setting, the input to loan valuation 
and debt contracting played dominant roles in shaping the balance sheet.  According to 
SFAC No. 2, paragraph 93, prior to the SEC the balance sheet was the primary financial 
statement and bankers and other lenders were the primary users. 
 Prior to the SEC, asset values were written up (as well as down) to market or 
“current values” consistent with both loan valuation input and debt contracting.  Most of 
the upward revaluations were of property, plant and equipment or investments (assets that 
could be used as collateral).  Fabricant (1936) found that in a sample of 208 large listed 
industrial firms, there were 70 write-ups of property, plant and equipment and 43 write-
ups of investments in the period 1925-1934.  There were only seven write-ups of 
intangibles for the sample, consistent with the accountants’ recommendations at the time 
that rights-based intangibles be written-up only in exceptional circumstances (see Yang, 
1927, p. 166; and Ely and Waymire, 1999a, p. 14) and with debt covenants’ tendency to 
exclude intangibles. 
 Revaluation was often associated with new financing (see Finney, 1935, chapter 
40).  Presumably, revaluation occurred when the marginal benefit exceeded the cost.  If a 
property had already been revalued by an independent appraiser for debt financing 
purposes, the marginal cost of reporting it in the financial statements (prior the SEC) 
would seem relatively low.  The marking of individual assets to market at the time of new 
financing is consistent with the balance sheet being an estimate of net asset value for the 
purposes of lending and valuing the loan.  It is also consistent with the debt-contract use 
of financial statements since the revalued numbers serve as the base for the book values 
used to control management actions and monitor the borrower during the life of the debt 
contract.  Note that write-ups after the loan do not typically increase the net assets for the 
purpose of the loan contract (see Leftwich, 1983, p. 32). 
 The political process appears to have entered standard setting sometime in the late 
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1930s.  By 1940 the practice of revaluing fixed assets was “virtually extinct” (Walker, 
1992, p. 3).  The SEC used the registration process to eliminate these write-ups.  The 
elimination of fixed asset revaluation appears tied to the emergence of political 
considerations in accounting standard setting.  In particular, several founding 
commissioners of the SEC were associated with a public political argument that the 
financial difficulties of the 1930s were due to asset write-ups. 8   Empirical research 
suggests the argument was false. 9  Given their prior public argument, the commissioners 
could not allow asset write-ups to continue.  Once in place for a number of years, the 
policy was difficult to change.  Many recent examples also point to the effects of the 
political process on the setting of accounting standards in general (e.g., the recent debates 
on accounting for stock options, Beresford, 1996, fair value accounting, Johnson and 
Swieringa, 1996, and the recent purchase/pooling debates).  
 From 1940 until the 1970s the SEC effectively banned upward asset revaluation 
in the financial statements and even disclosures of current values.  When the SEC lifted 
its ban in the early 1970s, few firms voluntarily wrote-up their assets.  In the 1970s, as in 
the 1920s, investors making equity and debt investment decisions undoubtedly still 
demanded information about the market values of the separable assets.  So the failure of 
the return to marking fixed assets to market in the 1970s is inconsistent with both the 
FASB’s valuation input demand and contracting.  What changed in the interim?  A 
reasonable hypothesis that has supporting evidence, is the failure to mark fixed assets to 
market was due to the growth in class action lawsuits against listed firms.  This growth 
occurred after the 1966 revision of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
the consequent increased legal liability for overstatements of assets and earnings (see 
Kothari, Lys, Smith and Watts, 1988; and Basu, 1997). 
                                                 
8Some of the SEC’s initial staff were drawn from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and three of the 
SEC’s founding commissioners were involved in the FTC’s dealings with public utilities” (Walker, 1992, 
p. 7).  The most outspoken opponent of write-ups was “Judge” Healy, a foundation SEC commissioner who 
headed the FTC’s investigation of the financial affairs of utilities, an inquiry that became protracted 
following the utilities’ financial difficulties in the early 1930s. That experience apparently soured Healy on 
asset write-ups.  The FTC and Healy considered asset write-ups as an important factor in the utilities’ 
financial difficulties. 
9Many accountants writing after the stock market crash stated or implied (without formal evidence) that 
assets written up in the 1920s were written down again in the 1930s.  Fabricant’s evidence, however, 
suggests the write-downs involved capitalized intangibles rather than previously revalued fixed assets or 
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 On net, the nature and evolution of contemporaneous balance sheets is more 
consistent with the provision of an estimate of net asset value as an input into firm 
valuation and/or contracting than with valuation of the firm per se.  There is some 
suggestion that other factors, in particular the political process and litigation, have also 
played a role in determining the balance sheet’s nature.  Overall it seems clear the value-
relevance criterion has not been the prime determinant of the nature of today’s balance 
sheet.   
 It is important to understand all of the influences that shape accounting in order to 
derive standard setting implications.  For example, measurement techniques are being 
developed to value assets like customer loyalty.  Assuming these techniques were refined, 
would we want to include these valuation estimates on the balance sheet if their inclusion 
moved the book value of equity value closer to the market value of equity?  Should the 
customer acquisition costs in the wireless industry be capitalized if that recognition 
helped equate book and market values of equity?  From a debt contracting perspective, 
the answer is likely no, since the net assets measure the value of the firm under 
liquidation and if the firm were liquidated, the customer assets might be worth far less 
than in a going concern.  Consider the same perspective in the context of Barth’s (1994) 
investigation of the fair value of banks’ investment securities.  From a depositor’s 
perspective, one might argue for recognizing the fair value of investment securities in the 
balance sheet, as it provides estimates of the value of the investment securities, even if 
the bank is not a going concern.  Unlike customer loyalty or goodwill, where the assets 
are not likely to be worth very much if the company is not a going concern, the value of 
the investment securities is likely to represent a reasonable liquidation value.  From this 
perspective, Barth’s (1994) setting is likely a reasonable one.10 
 
4.2 The conservatism of the income statement 
 An aspect of accounting exhibited by firms all around the world is the 
                                                                                                                                                 
investments (see Walker, 1992, pp. 5-6).  There was no evidence that the write-ups overstated the value of 
separable tangible assets for industrial listed firms. 
10However, political considerations may be operating in this environment and that can affect the accounting 
methods used in the balance sheet.  For example, savings and loans regulators  allowed S & L’s to continue 
to value assets above market to delay closure of insolvent S&L’s and to encourage their acquisitions (see 
Andrew, 1981; and Barth, Bartholomew and Bradley, 1990).  
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conservatism of the earnings number (see Ball, Kothari and Robin, 1999).  This 
conservatism takes the form of accounting anticipating  losses but not gains so that stock 
prices reflect good news (gains) earlier than do earnings while bad news is reflected in 
stock prices and earnings more contemporaneously.  Stock prices lead earnings more for 
gains than for losses.  Delaying recognition of gains while anticipating losses leads to the 
understatement of net assets.  Conservatism could be due to contracting, litigation and/or 
tax issues, thus highlighting the multi-purpose aspect of financial statements.  The pattern 
of conservatism observed around the world, and in the United States over time, is not 
explained by the value-relevance criterion. 
 The degree of conservatism observed in US income statements is inconsistent 
with the FASB’s stated views.  In SFAC No. 2, paragraph 93, the FASB states that 
conservatism “was once commonly expressed as the admonition to ‘anticipate no profits 
but anticipate all losses” and “Conservatism in financial reporting should no longer 
connote deliberate, consistent understatement of net assets and profits.”  SFAC No. 2 
attributes the development of conservatism to “bankers and other lenders who were the 
principal users of financial statements (prior to the SEC).”  The Statement further 
remarks (in 1980) that the “notion became deeply ingrained and is still in evidence 
despite efforts over the past 40 years to change it.” 
 
4.2.1 Conservatism arising for contracting purposes 
 Watts (1993, pp. 3-7) hypothesizes as to why conservatism might have evolved 
for both management and debt contracting purposes.  Conservatism reinforces debt 
contract provisions that ensure resources are kept within the firm to meet obligations to 
lenders.  Conservatism defers the recognition of income and, when combined with 
restrictions on dividends, reduces the likelihood that resources will be distributed 
inappropriately to parties with claims of lower precedence than the lenders.  It performs 
much the same function as the liquidator’s recognition of all potential losses before 
making an interim distribution of funds to claimants on the firm. 
 Hayn (1995) and Basu (1997) find that the relation between annual earnings and 
annual stock returns for US firms varies according to the nature of the news for the year.  
Hayn finds that the slope coefficient and the R2 in a regression of stock returns on 
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earnings are higher for firms showing profits than for firms showing losses.  Basu 
conducts a “reverse” regression of annual earnings on annual returns and finds that the 
slope coefficient and the R2 are higher for firms with negative unexpected returns than for 
firms with positive unexpected returns for the year.  As Basu shows, the two sets of 
results are essentially the same phenomena.  “Bad news” tends to be more fully reflected 
in both current earnings and returns than “good news.”  Losses are anticipated and 
written off at the time of the news.  Good news affects the current year’s return but the 
profit is not fully anticipated and is spread over the earnings of current and future years.  
In a given year the earnings effect is smaller relative to the return effect for profits than 
for losses.  The consequence is that the slope coefficient is higher for profits than losses if 
returns are regressed on earnings, but lower if earnings are regressed on returns.  
 The effect documented by Hayn and Basu is consistent with conservatism:  
“anticipate no profits but anticipate all losses.”  While Basu hypothesizes the effect is due 
to conservatism, Hayn hypothesizes it arises because of the abandonment option.  
Shareholders prefer to abandon the firm rather than bear predictable losses, hence 
observed losses are likely to be temporary.  Basu discriminates between the two 
hypotheses on the basis of the effect of accruals on the extent to which earnings are 
contemporaneous with returns and on the time series variation in the earnings-return 
relation.  He concludes the evidence is more consistent with conservatism. 
 The extent to which bad news is contemporaneous in earnings and returns is 
substantial in Basu’s study.  Earnings are four and a half times more sensitive to negative 
returns than to positive returns over the period, 1963-1990.  Ball, Kothari and Robin 
(1999) perform similar regressions on US and non-US firms for the period 1985-1995 
and find earnings is ten times more sensitive to negative returns than to positive returns in 
the period 1985-1995.  UK earnings are five times more sensitive to negative returns than 
to positive returns over the same period.  These results suggest a high degree of 
conservatism in US accounting, twice that observed in UK accounting, despite SFAC No. 
2’s condemnation of conservatism.  
 Ball, Kothari and Robin (1999) find evidence of conservatism in 19 of 25 
countries they study.  Moreover, they hypothesize the demand for conservatism is less in 
code law than common law countries because of lesser information asymmetry problems 
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in code law countries arising from the different governance structures.  They find 
evidence consistent with their predictions and so consistent with a contracting 
explanation.  Further, the value-relevance criterion for assessing accounting standards 
offers no explanation for the pervasive existence of conservatism or the varying demand 
for conservatism around the world.  While one of accounting’s roles is providing inputs 
to valuation, the substantial asymmetry between good news and bad news in the 
association between earnings and stock prices suggests the existence of other strong 
forces at work, including contracting. 
 
4.2.2 Conservatism arising from litigation 
 As we saw above, conservatism is consistent with contracting.  It is also 
consistent with a litigation motivation.  Overstatement of earnings or assets is far more 
likely to generate a lawsuit than understatement (see Kellogg, 1984, p. 186, footnote 3) 
and this creates incentives for managers to be conservative in reporting both earnings and 
assets.  Basu investigates the sensitivity of earnings to positive and negative returns over 
sub-periods of low or high auditor liability identified by Kothari, Lys, Smith and Watts 
(1988).  He finds no differences in the sensitivity to positive and negative returns in the 
low liability periods, but significant differences in the sensitivity in the predicted 
direction in the high liability periods.  One of the low periods is the period 1963-1966, 
prior to the changes in the rules for class actions suits.  These results are consistent with 
the change in litigation climate affecting the degree of conservatism of US accounting.11 
 
4.2.3 Conservatism and corporate income taxes 
 The existence of corporate income taxes can also lead to conservatism in 
accounting.  Guenther, Maydew and Nutter, 1997, pp. 230-234) discuss the effect of 
court decisions and IRS behavior on the relation between accruals for tax purposes and 
accruals for financial reporting purposes.  They conclude (p. 232):  “Overall, the evidence 
suggests the existence of implicit pressure to conform tax accounting methods to those 
                                                 
11However, alternative explanations and countervailing evidence exist.  Ball (1989) argues  that the change 
in litigation climate could have been driven by contracting changes.  Further, Ball, Kothari and Robin 
(1999) point out that in recent years the asymmetry of sensitivity of earnings according to good or bad 
news has also increased in France and Germany where litigation is not particularly an issue. 
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used for financial reporting purposes.”  Guenther, Maydew and Nutter present empirical 
evidence that firms forced to switch for tax purposes from the cash method of accounting 
to the accrual method by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, increased their deferral of income 
for financial statement purposes (became more conservative). 
 Whether or not it is contracting, litigation, political pressure (as in the lack of 
revaluation of fixed assets), income taxes, and/or something else that is causing the 
conservatism of US accounting practice, conservatism is not explained by the value-
relevance criterion.  Moreover, conservatism appears to be part of accounting practice 
around the world, albeit, in varying degrees. 
 
4.2.4 Evidence on conservatism over time in US financial statements 
 In this section, we provide evidence on the conservatism in US financial 
statements over time.  We find that conservatism in US financial statements (i) existed 
prior to formal standard setting in the US, (ii) has increased over time, and (iii) has 
increased to the point where virtually all of the association between earnings and stock 
prices is driven by bad news. 
 Despite the FASB’s condemnation of the notion of conservatism that implies 
different standards for recognizing gains versus losses (SFAC No. 2), there is evidence 
that conservatism in earnings of US listed companies has increased significantly during 
the FASB’s tenure (see Basu, 1997; and Givoly and Hayn, 2000).  Basu (1997) finds no 
evidence of conservatism prior to 1967 (see Basu, 1997, table 6) and that most of the 
increase in conservatism occurs after the establishment of the FASB in 1973 (see Basu, 
1997, figure 3).  This does not imply that the FASB caused an increase in conservatism, 
as it is possible that the implementation of standards by preparers and auditors, and not 
the standards themselves, have affected the degree of conservatism. 
 Basu’s failure to find significant conservatism prior to 1970 is puzzling given the 
many claims that it existed prior to that date.  Moreover, such a finding would be 
inconsistent with the view that conservatism would arise for contracting reasons which 
implies it should exist prior to the SEC’s establishment.  We thought the result could be 
due to Basu’s limited number of observations in the period prior to 1970.  To investigate 
that possibility, we asked Kirsten Ely to estimate a regression, similar to that estimated by 
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Basu in his table 6, for every year for the 1927-1993 sample of US firms used in Ely and 
Waymire (1999b).  That sample was generated by randomly drawing 100 firms each year 
from the CRSP Monthly Price File that met two criteria.  The criteria were that the firm 
had (1) stock price data available for 29 months from February of the prior year through 
June of the subsequent year; and (2) a four digit SIC code between 1000 and 3999.  
Earnings data were obtained from Compustat or Moody’s Industrial Manual and were not 
available for 30 of the 6,700 firm/years in the sample.  Most of these 30 firm/years are in 
the pre-1951 (pre-Compustat) period.  All years have at least 97 observations available. 
 The exact form of the regression estimated is: 
 Xt/Pt-1 = a0 + a1DRt + b0Rt+ b1DRtRt 
where Xt  is the firm earnings or operating earnings per share for year t, Pt-1 is the price at 
the beginning of year t, DRt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if Rt < 0 and zero otherwise, 
and Rt is the rate of return on the firm’s stock for year t.  The test for conservatism is 
whether the slope coefficient for the last term is significantly positive. 
 Mean estimated coefficients and mean t-statistics are calculated for sub-periods 
reflecting different standard setting, regulatory and litigation regimes.  Those sub-periods 
are 1927-41, 1942-46, 1947-50, 1951-53, 1954-66, 1967-75, 1976-82 and 1983-93.  The 
last three sub-periods are used by Basu and represent regimes of standard setting with 
high, low and high litigation, respectively.  The periods 1942-46 and 1951-53 are periods 
of general price controls that appear to affect the earnings/stock return relation.  The 
period 1927-1941 includes the period prior to the SEC’s elimination of write-ups in 1940 
(1941 is included rather than merely eliminating it –– its exclusion does not affect the 
results).  We consider the 1927-41 to be a period without standard setting or litigation.  
The periods after 1941 all had standard setting.  Those prior to 1967 had virtually no 
litigation.  Litigation increased significantly in 1967-75, decreased in 1976-82 and 
increased significantly again in 1983-93.  Mean coefficients are calculated for the 1963-
66 period for comparison to Basu’s results. 
 Table 2 reports mean coefficients for the overall sample period and for each sub-
period for both earnings and operating earnings.  The table also reports Basu’s results and 
the results of Ball, Kothari and Robin (1999) for a similar regression.  Basu uses a sample 
of 43,321 firm years in the period 1963-1990.  He estimates a pooled regression with 
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dummies on the coefficients for particular sub-periods.  We report sums of estimated 
coefficients from the Basu regressions that are comparable to the estimated coefficients 
from the Ely regressions.  Earnings and returns in the Basu regressions are adjusted for 
market earnings and returns.  Ball, Kothari and Robin (1999) run pooled regressions for 
two sub-periods of the 1985-95 period, using earnings before extraordinary items rather 
than earnings.  The Ball, Kothari and Robin 1985-90 regression is over 11,978 firm/years 
and their 1991-95 regression is over 9,247 firm/years. 
 From table 2 we see that for earnings, the mean coefficient of the dummy variable 
multiplied by return is significantly positive in the period prior to standard setting and 
litigation (1927-1941) and all periods post 1953 (other than the 1963-66 period).  The 
significance of the pre-standard setting period (1927-41) is consistent with our 
expectations that conservatism existed prior to formal standard setting and concerns 
about litigation.  The insignificance of the coefficient for that period in the operating 
earnings regressions suggests non-operating items are largely responsible for the 
conservatism.  Our insignificant result for the 1963-66 period confirms Basu’s result but 
suggests that period is not representative of the pre-litigation and standard-setting period.  
The lack of significant conservatism and the large significant mean coefficient of the 
return variable in the World War II price control period suggests those controls changed 
reported profits substantially. 
 Like Basu’s results, our results in table 2 indicate a substantial increase in 
conservatism since the creation of the FASB:  for regressions using earnings, the 
coefficient of the dummy multiplied by the return increases from something less than .10 
before 1976 to .16 in the period 1976-1982 and .43 in the period 1983-1993.  Similar 
increases are observed for the regressions using operating earnings, especially in the 
1983-1993 period.  Unlike Basu’s results, table 2 shows the increase beginning in the 
earnings regressions in the 1976-82 period rather than the 1967-75 period.  This 
difference could be due to different specifications of the regressions as well as 
differences in the sample.  The result remains though, that conservatism has increased 
during the FASB regime, though we do not attribute causality to the FASB. 
 Note also that in the earnings regressions the value-relevance of earnings in good 
news years (the mean coefficient of return) decreases during the FASB regime and 
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becomes zero and insignificant in the last (1983-93) period.  In the operating earnings 
regressions, though, the value-relevance of good news is still significant in the last 
period.  Basu also reports a coefficient close to zero (but still significant) in the last 
period and Ball, Kothari and Robin (1999) report a significant coefficient, which is close 
to zero in the period 1985-95.  These results suggest valuation (whether in the form of the 
valuation criterion or the form of provision of  inputs to valuation) is not the sole force, 
and perhaps not even the dominant force, at work in the contemporaneous accounting 
model.12 
 
4.3 The existence of dirty surplus  
 US accounting standard-setters have periodically professed a desire to require 
clean surplus (e.g., APB Opinion No. 9 in 1966, SFAC No.5 in 1984 and FASB 
Statement No. 130 in 1997).  Clean surplus means that changes in the book value of 
equity, other than those resulting from transactions with equity holders (investments and 
dividends), flow through earnings.  An objective of a clean surplus policy is “to avoid 
discretionary omissions of losses (or gains) from an income statement, thereby avoiding 
presentation of a more (or less) favorable report of performance or stewardship than is 
justified” (SFAC No. 5, paragraph 35). Dirty surplus is surplus that is dirtied by the 
inclusion of the effects of non-equity holder transactions that have not flowed through 
earnings.   US standard setters’ professed desire to follow a clean surplus policy has not 
been fulfilled.   Their difficulty in achieving clean surplus and the existence of dirty 
surplus in other Anglo-American countries is not explained by the value relevance 
criterion and suggests multiple forces are at work in determining accounting standards.   
 After the issuance of APB Opinion No. 9 in 1966, standard-setting bodies in the 
US nominally followed a clean-surplus policy.  More recently, the FASB included a 
clean surplus policy in SFAC No. 5 (paragraph 13) in 1984.  In practice, however, the 
clean surplus policy has not been followed very strictly.  For example, the FASB allowed 
certain gains and losses to by-pass the income statement and go directly to equity 
                                                 
12An issue we do not discuss, but also worth investigating is the conservative properties of the balance 
sheet.  We know that assets are much more likely to be written down than written up (lower of cost or 
market rule, rules on write-downs of assets, etc.). Moreover, we know that average price/book ratios are 
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(unrealized gains and losses on marketable securities, the change in foreign currency 
translation adjustment and additional pension liability in excess of unrecognized prior 
service cost).  FASB Statement No. 130 requires the disclosure of comprehensive income 
which, if it were the bottom line of the income statement, would result in clean surplus.  
However, the statement does not specify the financial statement in which comprehensive 
income must appear and preliminary evidence indicates that it is disclosed in practice in 
the statement of changes in equity (see Hirst and Hopkins, 1998, p.49).  Thus, in practice, 
surplus is still dirty.  
  The magnitude of dirty surplus appears to be material in many cases.  Lo and Lys 
(1999) estimate the amount of dirty surplus as the absolute difference between 
comprehensive (clean surplus) income and GAAP net income as a percentage of 
comprehensive net income in the period 1962-1997.  They find that while the median 
deviation is only 0.40%, the mean is 15.71%, and 14.4% of firm/years have dirty surplus 
that exceeds 10% of comprehensive income.  
 We have argued that consistent application of the value relevance criterion would 
result in the book value of equity being an estimate (or transformation of an estimate) of 
the market value of equity and earnings being an estimate (or transformation of an 
estimate) of the level of or change in equity market value.   In doing so, we relied on two 
of the three valuation models used in the literature (the earnings model and the balance 
sheet model).   The other valuation model used in the literature (the Ohlson model) 
expresses equity market value as a linear function of current earnings, dividends and 
book value of equity. In that case the linear combination would be an estimate (or 
transformation of an estimate) of market value.  In none of the three cases can the value 
relevance criterion explain dirty surplus.   
 Studies using both earnings and balance sheet valuation models do not explain 
how the two estimates of value would interact (i.e., how the income statement and 
balance sheet would articulate).  If earnings are an estimate of equity value (or an 
estimate of the change in equity value) and book equity is an estimate of equity value, 
how would differentces in the estimates be reconciled in the financial statements?  No 
                                                                                                                                                 
well over one in most time periods.  This suggest the balance sheet contains many conservative elements as 
well, another fact that cannot be explained by the value relevance criterion. 
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one seems to have thought of that problem.13  The third valuation model, the Ohlson 
model, uses both the book value of equity and earnings and assumes clean surplus.   
 The failure of the relevance literature to explain dirty surplus is significant given 
dirty surplus has existed for most of the period in which we have had formal accounting 
standards in the US and other Anglo-American accounting countries.  Dirty surplus 
existed prior to standard setting and continues to exist today.  Prior to the SEC in the US, 
unrealized gains from asset write-ups went to surplus rather than income (Dillon, 1979) 
or were used to offset intangible assets or accumulated losses in retained earnings (Saito, 
1983, pp. 14-19).  Today upward revaluations of assets in Australia and the UK still go to 
reserves in owners’ equity rather than to the income statement (Brown, Izan and Loh, 
1992, p. 37).  These observations are inconsistent with clean surplus being an equilibrium 
accounting choice. 
 The existence of dirty surplus can be explained by the existence of multiple roles 
for financial reporting.  For example, as we have already noted, the balance sheet could 
provide an estimate of the liquidation value of net assets for lenders while earnings could 
be used as a performance measure for compensation contracting and monitoring 
purposes. Given the different purposes of the statements, dirty surplus would be 
necessary to have the two statements articulate.   The lending role for the balance sheet 
suggests it would reflect the market value of assets such as property plant and equipment 
and we noted earlier in this section that prior to the SEC asset revaluation was often 
associated with financing events.  Changes in the values of those assets, however, may be 
considered beyond the manager’s control and so excluded from the performance measure 
(earnings) that is used for compensation and monitoring purposes.  As we saw above, 
prior to the SEC that is exactly what occurred. 
 
4.4 How contracting, litigation and taxes affect accounting standards and 
practice 
 Anglo-American accounting had evolved to a significant degree prior to the 
formation of the SEC and listed firms were audited.  There was concern with issues such 
                                                 
13 In some cases (e.g.,Barth, 1994) the lack of explanation is might be due to an implicit assumption that the 
value relevance criterion will not be used widely in standard setting. 
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as verifiability and evidence of accounting principles.  For example, Dillon (1979) found 
that, while approximately a quarter of his sample of 110 NYSE firms had an upward 
revaluation during 1925-34, not one used a revaluation to increase earnings.   That 
observation is consistent with accounting and financial reporting fulfilling a contracting 
role (see above).  Also consistent with contracting was the general view that accounting 
and financial reporting served a stewardship function (see Zeff, 1999, p. 17).  As we have 
seen, the FASB itself viewed the balance sheet as the prime statement prior to the SEC 
and considered it a document aimed at lenders.  In addition to the parties to the firm itself 
(e.g., shareholders and managers), a broad set of external institutions (banks, private debt 
holders, etc.) relied on audited financial accounting reports for contracting purposes.   
 It is difficult to believe that Congress, the SEC and standard setters could or 
would be able to take an institution (financial reporting) fulfilling an important economic 
function (contracting) and, by fiat, totally convert it to a different function.   There was a 
large set of parties with vested interests in the contracting use of the audited financial 
reports with the resources to oppose changes that made contracting more costly.  These 
interests’ potential lobbying with Congress and the SEC likely deterred standard-setters 
from changing financial reporting such that it did not meet contracting demands.  There is 
some suggestion they did not.  As late as 1975 the FASB found that only 37 percent of 
respondents to their survey agreed that “The basic objective of financial statements is to 
provide information useful for making economic decisions.  . . . Those who disagreed 
took the position that the basic function of financial statements was to report on 
management’s stewardship of corporate assets and that the informational needs of readers 
was of secondary importance ”  (Armstrong, 1977, p.77).   While the increase in litigation 
could have changed attitudes and actions since 1975, it seems likely that current-day 
accounting numbers reflect contracting objectives as well as the broad investor 
information objective. 
 Litigation and taxes could also affect standard setting via the political process.  
Auditors and others negatively affected by increased liability under litigation are likely to 
lobby with Congress and the SEC to make financial statements conservative.  Managers 
and investors in firms affected by a proposal to require the capitalization of development 
expenditures in the wireless communication industry are likely to lobby against such a 
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proposal because of its effect on taxes and firm value.  
 It is conceivable that we are in a period in which standard setters are moving 
away from the demands that accounting originally evolved to meet to one that adopts a 
pure information to equity investors perspective.  If this is true, standards should be 
reflecting the value-relevance criterion or the input to valuation role with increasing 
frequency.  However, the evidence on conservatism suggests this is not the case.  
Moreover, very recent decisions of the FASB, such as the recent stock options standard, 
are consistent with a standard setting process that does not follow the value-relevance 
criterion.  Beresford (1996) discusses how the FASB responded to the political pressure 
arising from its stock options project in order to survive, at the expense of what the board 
felt was the superior standard.  Further, Zeff (1999) details how the FASB’s potential 
reliance on the conceptual framework has been repeatedly broken by political pressure 
from preparers, users, auditors and Congress.  Leftwich (1995) argues that the FASB 
even sets its agenda by choosing areas where it can restrict the set of currently available 
choices and appease the SEC.  Thus, if we are moving closer to a value-relevance 
criterion, the move seems almost imperceptible.  Moreover, recent evidence (Chang, 
1999; and Brown, Lo and Lys, 1999) suggests the value-relevance of financial statements 
has declined in recent in recent years. 
 Auditors and managers may also choose to make accruals more income deferring 
and net asset reducing within the bounds of GAAP causing accounting practice to be 
more conservative.  As we have seen, the evidence of Basu (1997) is consistent with US 
accounting practice becoming more conservative after increases in auditor liability.  
There is also evidence that the link between tax and reporting accruals has also become 
stronger in recent years (see Guenther, Maydew and Nutter, 1997).  Institutional 
arrangements play an important role in the way standards are implemented.  Ball, Robin 
and Wu (2000) investigate the timeliness and conservatism of virtually identical 
accounting standards adopted in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.  They 
find large differences in the timeliness and conservatism of earnings as judged by the 
association between earnings and returns in these four countries.  They conclude that the 
differences are driven by managers’ and preparers’ incentives to disclose material 
information, which are a function of the market-orientation of the economy, litigation, 
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taxes and political costs.  Thus, accounting standards alone, do not determine the 
properties of the accounting reports, and the same forces that affect the adoption of new 
standards affect the implementation of those standards as well. 
 
4.5 Conclusion on value-relevance and GAAP 
 It is apparent that the value-relevance criterion does not determine the nature of 
GAAP, nor is it obvious it is a dominant force.  Other factors that appear to affect the 
nature of GAAP include contracting, litigation, political and tax considerations.  None of 
this means that accounting’s role in providing inputs into valuation is irrelevant.  What it 
does mean is that role is only part of the equation. 
 If, as researchers, we provide standard-setters with value-relevance evidence only, 
we do the standard-setters a disservice because we ignore the fact that financial 
statements have multiple purposes.  The existence of the competing hypotheses to explain 
conservatism is due in part to the many roles that accounting statements are asked to 
fulfill.  If we imply that standard-setters should try to make the balance sheet measure 
firm value when such an outcome is not the equilibrium demand of financial statements 
users, we encourage standard-setters to fail.  In addition, if input to valuation is only a 
part of the role of accounting, our research will have a small influence on the standard-
setting process if we do not take account of the other roles that accounting standard 
setters consider. 
 Value-relevance research might be more useful if we could explain when the 
valuation input role is likely to be operating without interference from other forces and 
when it is likely to be affected by other factors.  Research of that type would require an 
explicit understanding of the other factors and forces that shape accounting standards and 
some predictive ability of their strength in varying circumstances.  As it is now, the 
value-relevance literature is attempting to provide evidence that is useful for standard 
setting without a descriptive theory of accounting or standard setting.  Understanding the 
nature and strength of the other forces that shape accounting would lead to an improved 
understanding of accounting and should aid standard setters in balancing the multiple 
objectives of financial reporting. 
 In the next two sections we ignore the inconsistencies between the rationale for 
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value-relevance and what the FASB says and does in setting standards.  Instead we 
assume the value-relevance criterion is correct and look at the implications of the value-
relevance literature’s valuation models for accounting standards (section 5). 
 
5. The Valuation Model and Links to Accounting Numbers 
 As we noted, investigating the relation between accounting numbers and firm 
value requires a valuation model to specify the attributes affecting firm value and their 
relation to firm value.  A link between the accounting numbers and firm attributes is also 
required.  It is important that the valuation model chosen to investigate the relation 
between accounting numbers and firm value be appropriate for valuing the attributes of 
the firms investigated in the study.  Further, the links between the attributes valued and 
accounting numbers should be carefully specified to generate implications for those 
numbers (e.g., as in the balance sheet model in Barth, 1994).  In this section we 
investigate the appropriateness of the valuation models used in the literature and the 
specification of their links to accounting numbers allow inferences.  The ability to make 
standard setting inferences depends critically on both the valuation model’s 
appropriateness and the links’ specification.  This is true also of inferences in areas of 
capital markets research (e.g., valuation literature) so that much of the discussion in this 
section applies to those areas as well. 
 The valuation models are often inappropriate for the use to which they are put and 
the accounting links to those models are often not specified.  One result is potentially 
incorrect predictions for the signs and magnitudes of coefficients of accounting numbers 
in regressions in incremental association studies.  Another is an exacerbated correlated 
omitted variables problem. 
 In many incremental association studies of balance sheet components, the 
valuation model is that the market value of equity is equal to the market value of the 
assets minus the market value of the liabilities (e.g., Barth, 1991).  We label that the 
balance sheet model.  Twenty-one studies in Table 1 use the balance sheet model and 20 
of them are incremental association studies.  The model holds only if all the relevant 
markets exist (there is a market for each asset and liability as well as for the stock) and all 
markets are competitive so there are no expected above-competitive returns (rents) to the 
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firm.  In addition, there can be no corporate control frictions, so management liquidates 
the firm if that is the optimal action.  In other words, we would not observe a firm’s 
market value below the market value of its net assets.  The link between the accounting 
numbers and the attributes valued is that book values of accounting assets and liabilities 
convey information about the market values of those assets and liabilities. 
 In earnings association studies, earnings are assumed to be informationally linked 
to future cash flows or valued directly (earnings model).  Consequently, stock market 
rates of return (or the equity values) are regressed on: i) components of earnings and/or 
earnings component changes; or ii) earnings and/or earnings changes (e.g., Dhaliwal, 
Subramanyam and Trezevant, 1999).  In some cases, a reverse regression is estimated 
with earnings regressed on market rates of return (as in Beaver, Lambert and Morse, 
1980).  Twenty-two studies in Table 1 use an earnings model.  Eight conduct relative 
association studies and 18 conduct incremental association studies (four studies conduct 
both kinds of association studies). 
 A third specification comes from the Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson 
(1995) which indicates that, given a dividend valuation model and clean surplus 
accounting, stock price can be written as a linear function of earnings and book value of 
equity (Ohlson model).  In this case, abnormal earnings (earnings minus cost of book 
capital) can be thought of as an attribute investors value; an informational link to earnings 
is not required.  Amir, Harris and Venutti (1993) use this approach in a relative 
association study.  Twenty-nine studies in Table 1 use the Ohlson model as motivation 
for specification of their empirical tests, but only 15 use the specification that includes 
both earnings and book value as independent variables.  The others regress returns on 
earnings and earnings changes. 
 
5.1 Balance sheet model 
5.1.1 Valuation model 
 In its levels form, the balance sheet model for an incremental association study 
takes the following form: 
 MVE = MVA + MVL +MVC (1) 
Where 
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MVE  = market value of equity 
MVA = market value of separable assets other than the component whose 
incremental association is being assessed 
MVL = market value of separable liabilities other than the component whose 
incremental association is being assessed (liabilities are assumed to be 
negative values) 
MVC = market value of the balance sheet component whose incremental 
association is being assessed. 
As noted, this model holds if the firm is earning a competitive rate of return on its net 
assets.  The future cash flows, discounted using the appropriate cost of capital, equal the 
net asset values. 
 If the firm has some competitive advantage (e.g., proprietary technology that may 
not be separable and saleable) that allows it to earn a positive abnormal return (rents), 
then equation (1) does not hold.  The equity value exceeds the net assets value.  Then 
equity value is a weighted average of operations value (the value from continuing 
operations plus the value of future expansion options), and abandonment value (net asset 
value) (see Berger and Ofek, 1996; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; and Wysocki, 1999).  
Ignoring agency costs, the firm would liquidate (abandon) when the net assets value 
exceeds the operations value of the firm.  With rents, the relevance of net assets depends 
on the likelihood of abandonment.  If the likelihood of abandonment is effectively zero, 
the value of net assets is not associated with the value of the firm except to the extent it 
affects future operating cash flows (for example, when replacing assets).  If operations 
value exceeds net assets but there is a likelihood of abandonment then equity value is an 
increasing convex function of net assets.  It is also an increasing convex function of 
operations value (see Wysocki, 1999, p. 17). 
 Many incremental association studies using the balance sheet model allow for the 
possibility that firms have a competitive advantage.  For example, value-relevance 
studies for banks recognize that bankers might earn rents on core deposits (e.g., Eccher, 
Ramesh and Thiagarajan, 1996).  To allow for the fact that equation (1) does not hold 
with rents, some value-relevance researchers convert it to an identity by including a 
goodwill term that is defined as the difference between market value of equity and net 
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assets value:   
 MVE º MVA + MVL +MVC + GW (2) 
Where  
GW =  goodwill. 
The introduction of goodwill makes equation (2) hold tautologically.  It is defined as: 
 GW º MVE-MVA-MVL-MVC 
In these cases, independent variables are often included in the regression to proxy for 
goodwill, but goodwill is not a separable asset, being merely the difference between 
MVE and the other variables. 
 
5.1.2 Links to accounting numbers 
 If the balance sheet model holds (i.e., there are no rents) the links between the 
accounting numbers and the valuation model variables are relatively apparent.  The 
variables are the market values of assets and liabilities.  It is assumed that each 
accounting asset or liability number could provide information on the asset or liability’s 
market value.  For each asset or liability there should be an accounting number and a 
market value.  In practice, some assets that are separable and marketable are not recorded 
as an accounting asset (sometimes for non-information reasons such as tax effects, for 
example the development expense in Amir and Lev, 1996).  Also an accounting asset can 
be recorded for an item that is not a separable and marketable asset (i.e., purchased 
goodwill).  If the balance sheet model does not hold (i.e., there are rents) the links to the 
accounting numbers become more difficult. 
 
5.1.3 Implications for incremental association studies 
Coefficient of component being assessed.  Non-measurement studies assess the 
MVC’s value-relevance by testing whether its estimated coefficient in equation (1) is 
significantly different from zero.  For an asset, the test might be that the coefficient is 
significantly positive and for a liability that it is significantly negative. 
The presence of rents could affect the sign of the coefficient of an asset or 
liability.  For example, consider a firm where abandonment has effectively a zero 
probability.  Then unless an asset’s value is correlated with the omitted rents, its 
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coefficient could be zero rather than positive.  If the asset value is correlated with future 
cash flows the expected sign could be negative or positive.  Suppose the asset price is 
determined by the demand from another industry.  Then an increase in that asset value 
could represent higher cash outflows in the future to purchase the asset and be negatively 
correlated with future cash flows. 
Measurement studies typically predict that the coefficients of assets should be one 
and those of liabilities should be minus one.  The extent to which the coefficients differ 
from one or minus one is used to assess the extent to which accounting numbers measure 
the market values of assets or liabilities with error (see Barth, 1991; Barth, Beaver and 
Landsman, 1996; and Eccher, Ramesh and Thiagarajan, 1996).  This approach relies on 
strong assumptions about the bias with which the accounting numbers measure the 
underlying attributes, the correlation between the measurement errors and the underlying 
attributes, and the correlation between the measurement errors and other variables in the 
regression (see Lambert, 1996).  Even if these conditions are met, the procedure will fail 
in the presence of rents because the coefficients of assets and liabilities are not likely to 
be one and minus one respectively.  Equation (1) does not hold and equity value is a non-
linear function of net assets so one wouldn’t predict that the coefficients would be one 
and minus one.  Further, the coefficient would vary across firms with the likelihood of 
abandonment. 
Correlated omitted variables.  Even if there are no rents, equation (1) requires the 
inclusion of all asset and liability market values.  Often some of those asset and liability 
values are not included in the regression equation (see Lys, 1996, p. 161).  As is 
recognized in several studies, if the omitted values are correlated with the included 
values, the estimated coefficients of the included values can be biased from their 
predicted values of one and minus one.  The existence of rents creates a further 
opportunity for the problem of correlated variables.  If no proxies are included for rents 
(equation 1 is estimated), some of the included assets and liabilities can be correlated 
with rents.  For example, if banks invest in loans where they have informational 
advantages, rents could be correlated with the market value of those loans (see the 
discussion in Eccher, Ramesh and Thiagarajan, 1996, p. 85).  Even if proxies are 
included for rents, if those proxies do not account for all of the variation in rents and if 
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included asset or liability variables are correlated with rents, the estimated asset and 
liability coefficients will be biased. 
Assessing the value-relevance of assets that are proposed to be included in the 
balance sheet, or disclosed for the first time, illustrates the linking difficulties that arise 
with both omitted assets and rents.  For example, Eccher, Ramesh and Thiagarajan (1996) 
assess the value-relevance of the market value of items that are currently not recorded on 
the balance sheet and whose market values are not currently disclosed (OBS items).  
Those items include credit-related instruments (e.g., letters of credit) for which the fair 
value is not available.  Eccher et al (1996) are forced to use notional values for those 
credit instruments.  As Eccher et al (1996) recognize, those notional values are likely to 
be correlated both with the fair values of the instruments and (because they are related to 
future revenues) with future cash flows.  Hence, Eccher et al (1996) cannot predict a sign 
for the coefficient of the credit-related instruments’ value in an incremental relevance 
study and, if the coefficient is significant, cannot tell whether it is due to the instruments’ 
value and/or expected rents. 
 
5.2 Earnings model 
5.2.1 Valuation model 
 In relative association studies stock returns are often regressed on alternative 
measures of earnings.  The measure whose regression has the highest R2 is considered the 
best performance measure or most value relevant.  These studies compare income 
measures within a country (e.g., Dhaliwal, Subramanyam and Trezevant, 1999, 
comparing measures of comprehensive income to net income) or net income measures 
across countries (e.g., Barth and Clinch, 1996).  In incremental association studies, the 
market value of equity is often regressed on components of earnings.  For example, 
Barth, Beaver and Landsman (1992) regress the market value of equity on earnings 
components to assess the incremental value-relevance of pension cost components.  
These studies imply earnings are related to stock market value or changes in value, but in 
many cases the valuation model is not explicitly specified. 
 Generally, the measurement studies specify an explicit valuation model.  In those 
studies involving regressions of equity market value on earnings the earnings coefficient 
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is expected to be 1/r, where r is the discount rate for future earnings (e.g., Barth, 
Landsman and Wahlen, 1995).  Similarly when the stock rate of return is regressed on 
earnings components or changes in earnings components, the equivalent predicted 
coefficient for earnings or earnings change before the component (deflated by opening 
price) is 1/r, or close to 1/r, (e.g., Barth, 1994).  In these studies, earnings are viewed as 
“permanent” earnings or the “long run” earnings power of the firm and price is viewed as 
capitalized earnings (see Barth, Landsman and Wahlen, 1995, p. 586). 
 “Permanent earnings” is just capitalized earnings converted to a perpetuity.  
Permanent earnings are equivalent to the transformation of net present value to equivalent 
annual cost or uniform annual cash flow (see Brealey and Myers, 1996, p. 128).  As such, 
it is a transformation of the estimate of value, not the underlying valuation model - it 
provides no indication of the attributes that are valued.  The primary valuation model is 
discounted dividends.  The discounted earnings model is just a re-expression of the 
dividend model using the dividend payout assumption (see Beaver, 1998). 
 The non-measurement relative association studies are consistent with the 
assumption that earnings measure (or are a transformation of) permanent income since 
the criterion is R2.  The lower the error with which earnings measure permanent earnings 
(a transformation of value), the higher the R2 from the regression of value on earnings. 
 The equality of current earnings and permanent earnings can be achieved by 
assuming that the time series of future earnings follow a random walk.  However, such an 
assumption would be inconsistent with empirical evidence for the US.  We know that 
earnings changes are transient for extreme earnings, perhaps because of the abandonment 
option (e.g., Hayn, 1995) or conservatism (e.g., Basu, 1997).  Note also that the 
transience of extreme earnings implies a non-linear relation between returns and earnings 
and there is ample evidence to support that implication (e.g., Freeman and Tse, 1992).  
This non-linearity is not reflected in the regressions used in the literature. 
 
5.2.2 Links to accounting numbers 
 There is no equivalent to permanent income under current GAAP.  Yet the 
numbers employed in the earnings model (some version of earnings) in relative 
association studies are assumed to represent permanent income or the methodology is 
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consistent with that assumption.  The use of the value-relevance earnings criterion based 
on the permanent income concept as the sole criterion to set accounting standards, would 
result in an earnings number that is associated with value (see section 2).  But, the 
earnings model provides no theory as to what should be in earnings itself, or what should 
be its important components because permanent earnings is just a transformation of 
value.  The model provides no theory of accounting and when combined with the value-
relevance criterion, is purely a mechanical procedure for producing an earnings number 
that is highly correlated with value (non-measurement studies) or is a measure of value 
(measurement studies).  Use of this mechanical criterion in an unfettered fashion by 
standard setters could actually remove the ability of accounting information to provide 
new information to capital market participants. 
 
5.2.3 Implications for association studies 
Lack of guidance for earnings and its components.  Because it has no theory of 
accounting, the earnings model provides no guidance to researchers (or standard-setters) 
as to what numbers should be included in earnings, other than highly associated with 
value or return.  Lacking guidance from a theory, researchers investigate earnings 
numbers or components of earnings calculated according to existing or proposed 
standards.  This is poses a conundrum for the value relevance literature: proposed 
standards are often generated on grounds other than value-relevance (see Leftwich, 1995 
for an investigation of agenda-setting for the FASB) but value relevance studies evaluate 
them on the value-relevance criterion. 
When the earnings model is used to determine components of earnings 
(incremental association studies), the incremental association depends on the other 
numbers in the regression.  Because no guidance is provided as to how to sequence the 
investigations of components, the sequence of investigation for the US depends on what 
components the researcher chooses to include, and the sequence in which different 
accounting numbers or components are considered and adopted by the FASB.  
Coefficients of earnings and earnings components.  The lack of consideration of 
growth and abandonment option characteristics suggests incorrect predictions for the 
coefficient of earnings in relative association measurement studies (e.g., the coefficient is 
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unlikely to be the predicted function of the discount rate).  A similar problem arises for 
component studies even if the time series properties of components are taken into account 
(as in Barth, Beaver and Landsman, 1992) because option problems apply to the 
components as well. 
Correlated omitted variables.  Some earnings components (such as depreciation) 
could be positively correlated cross-sectionally with net assets.  Hence, they could proxy 
for the omitted abandonment (and growth) options. 
 
5.3 Ohlson model 
5.3.1 Valuation model 
 The Ohlson model derives from the residual income valuation model, which takes 
the following form: 
 MVE 0 = BV0 + {[E 0
t = 1
¥
å (X t ) - rE 0 (BVt - 1)](1 + r) -1 }  
Where 
MVE0 = market value of equity at time 0 
BVt  = book value of equity at time t 
R = investor’s opportunity cost of capital 
X = reported earnings 
Et  = expectation operator at time t 
 The model is derived from the dividend valuation model given clean surplus 
accounting  (change in book value of equity = earnings less dividends plus or minus 
capital transactions).  The model holds for any set of accounting methods as long as the 
clean surplus condition holds.  Changes in future earnings or changing from one set of 
methods to another are offset by changes in book value.  Consequently, like the earnings 
model, the residual income valuation model per se provides no theory for accounting and 
no practical prescription for one accounting method over another other than association 
with value or ability to forecast future earnings (see Coopers & Lybrand Academic 
Advisory Committee, 1997). 
 The residual income valuation model provides a specification of the relation 
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between market value and future abnormal earnings (earnings above the required rate of 
return times the beginning-of-period book value) and the current book value of equity.  
But those abnormal earnings vary according to the accounting methods used and are 
unlikely to equal economic abnormal returns (returns greater than the cost of capital 
times the beginning-of-period market value of net assets).  Further, the book value is 
unlikely to be the market value of net assets. 
 The Ohlson model  replaces the value of future abnormal earnings in the residual 
income valuation model by current earnings.  Ohlson (1995) derives a version of the 
residual income model that can express market value as a linear function of current 
earnings, dividends and book value by making assumptions about the behavior of 
earnings and their relation to information in stock prices (the information dynamics of 
earnings).  Any test of these equations (the Ohlson model) is a joint test of the residual 
income valuation model and the assumed information dynamics.  So, as with the earnings 
model, variation in association between earnings based on different accounting methods 
and value, or between different countries’ earnings and value, could be due to variation in 
the extent to which the information dynamics assumptions fit across accounting methods 
or countries. 
 The addition of information dynamics does not provide the Ohlson model with an 
ability for selecting an optimal accounting method.  As with the residual income 
valuation model, a potentially large number of accounting methods fit the model.  All that 
is added to the clean surplus requirement of the more general model is that an appropriate 
information dynamics must be specified (one in which the future earnings can be 
expressed in terms of current variables). 
 While the Ohlson model does lead to the inclusion of the book value of net equity 
or net assets in the regressions, it does not allow for the existence of options.  Book value 
is there in order to make the equation hold, not to measure the market value of net assets, 
for purposes of assessing the abandonment option.  As with the residual income valuation 
model, book value in the Ohlson model can be anything (as long as there are offsetting 
changes in future abnormal earnings).  Options will interfere with the linear relations 
between market value and future earnings and book value and between market value and 
current earnings, dividends and book value. 
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 Not only is the Ohlson model inconsistent with an abandonment option, due to the 
information dynamics assumption it is also inconsistent with firms having expected rents 
(expected positive net present value projects –– see Lo and Lys, 1999, pp. 13-14).   
 
5.3.2 Links to accounting numbers 
 As noted above, like the earnings model, the Ohlson model has no empirical 
implications for the choice of different accounting procedures.  So the only implication 
comes from the value-relevance literature’s methodology, not from the model:  choose 
the procedures that yield book value and earnings numbers that in combination are most 
highly associated with market value of equity.  Coopers & Lybrand’s Academic Advisory 
Committee (1997) asserts that the model implies that accounting methods should be 
chosen on the basis of the association of book values with intrinsic values and the 
prediction of future earnings, but that implication does not flow from the model itself. 
 
5.3.3 Implications for association studies 
 The implications for the Ohlson model are much the same as those for the 
earnings model.  The one difference in the Ohlson model-based studies, is that those 
studies include a book value term that could cross-sectionally proxy for net assets value 
and potentially reduce the correlated omitted variables problem (for the omission of net 
assets). 
 
5.4 Summary 
 The valuation models employed in the literature (value-relevance and capital 
markets) have no role for accounting.  The perfect and complete markets assumption that 
generates the balance sheet model and the competitive capital markets assumption of the 
discounted dividends model that underlies the earnings and Ohlson models assume 
costless information.  The valuation models supply no theory of accounting.   
 The assumption that accounting numbers provide information for valuation that 
underlies the value-relevance literature, by itself, provides very little in the way of a 
theory of accounting.  It cannot explain components of income for example.  The only 
link between accounting numbers and valuation is that the accounting numbers somehow 
7:57 AM                     10/6/2000                                                   56 
 
 
provide information on variables in the valuation.  Incremental association studies using 
the balance sheet model often make the link explicit via the assumption of no rents and 
the assumption that individual accounting assets and liabilities numbers measure their 
market values implicit in the market value of equity.  The no rents assumption, however, 
is likely not descriptive in many industries and exacerbates correlated omitted variable 
problems.   
 The earnings models do not have a link to accounting earnings since permanent 
earnings is merely a transformation of equity value itself.  That means there is no theory 
to make any predictions about the nature of earnings and their relation to value.  The 
Ohlson model, as employed with current earnings and book value as explanatory 
variables, assumes no rents.  Further, because it is simply a transformation of the 
discounted dividend model using a clean surplus assumption, the model cannot 
distinguish between alternative accounting systems.  As long as earnings and book value 
can be transformed to meet the clean surplus assumption the accounting system is 
consistent with the model. 
 None of the models can satisfactorily address expansion and growth options.  
Such options are likely to make relations between accounting variables and value non-
linear.  Since all the models are estimated with linear regressions this creates problems 
for predictions of the coefficients in incremental association studies. 
 Given these problems, even if providing inputs to valuation were the only role for 
financial accounting, value-relevance, as it is currently specified, cannot provide much in 
the way of predictions for accounting practice.  Consequently it cannot provide much 
guidance to standard setters either. 
 
 
6. Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research 
The prime objective of this paper is to assess the value relevance literature’s 
contribution to standard setting.  While the existing value relevance literature is large, its 
contribution to standard setting seems modest.  A major reason is that the literature 
concentrates on equity valuation.  Much of the literature is motivated by an assumption 
that accounting provides inputs to investors’ valuations, but the empirical tests amount to 
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either associations with equity value or in many cases to equity valuation per se. This 
conflicts with the FASB’s explicit denial that accounting is concerned with providing 
direct estimates of value and with the nature and history of US accounting practice.  Even 
studies that attempt to indirectly tease out attributes the FASB considers important to 
accounting numbers (such as relevance and reliability) rely on the extent to which those 
attributes are reflected in equity market values.  Potential differences between the 
attributes reflected in stock market associations and the FASB’s definition of the 
attributes (e.g., reliability or relevance to another user group) are not explored.   And, the 
indirect nature of the extraction of these attributes, together with the reliance on valuation 
models inappropriate to most situations, make standard setting inferences questionable in 
most circumstances (investigation of investment securities held by banks is perhaps one 
of the most favorable set of circumstances). 
Even if the value relevance literature’s tests did effectively provide evidence on 
accounting’s role in providing inputs to equity investor valuation, those tests still ignore 
the other roles of accounting and other forces in the determination of accounting 
standards and practice.  To the extent accounting standards and practice are shaped by 
other roles and forces that are not perfectly correlated with the valuation role, the value 
relevance literature misses key attributes of accounting.  In this paper, we argue these 
other forces are substantive and when we examine certain attributes of accounting 
numbers, we think it is clear that at least some of these other forces are strong and 
perhaps have become stronger over time. The evidence on conservatism is consistent 
with that hypothesis. 
Conversations with individuals currently and formerly associated with the FASB 
suggest those individuals are confused about how to interpret the value relevance 
evidence and how to use it in their deliberations. 14   While intuitively those individuals, 
as well as academics, sense something useful must arise from knowing the degree of 
association between equity valuations and accounting numbers, they find it hard to 
pinpoint exactly what implications that association has for potential accounting standards.  
                                                 
14 While the FASB clearly tracks academic research and promotes interactions between the board and the 
academic community (Beresford and Johnson, 1995), they struggle with how to use it in their deliberations 
(Leisenring and Johnson, 1994). 
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The points raised in this paper might partially explain why individuals associated with the 
FASB have difficulty obtaining guidance from the value relevance literature.   
Standard setters would be aided if accounting researchers spent more resources 
investigating the many forces that shape accounting.  Moreover, we believe such research 
would lead to a more fully developed theory of accounting.  We worry that many 
researchers have begun to assume (without supporting evidence) that accounting is 
predominantly concerned with equity valuation and have lost sight of the other important 
roles for accounting.15  Given our concerns, we use the issues raised in this paper to 
suggest interesting research topics.  We believe that pursuit of the type of research 
suggested would generate a more descriptive theory of accounting that would aid 
academics, as well as standard setters, in understanding the forces that shape accounting.  
The apparent conservatism of accounting is a phenomenon that is beginning to attract 
more attention in accounting research (e.g., Basu, 1997; Ball, Kothari and Robin, 1999).   
Given conservatism’s apparent pervasiveness in accounting over time and across 
countries, increased research into conservatism seems likely to yield significant 
improvements in understanding accounting.  The current assumption of the dominance of 
the equity valuation role of accounting, suggests it would be informative to investigate 
whether conservatism can be explained by that role.  For example, can the abandonment 
option explain conservatism (see Hayn, 1995)?  Variation in conservatism across 
countries suggests studies to investigate the reasons for such cross-sectional variation.  
We have argued that contracting (including stewardship), litigation, political 
considerations, taxes and other institutional arrangements can influence the degree of 
conservatism across countries.  Does the influence of these factors vary across countries 
in a way that explains international variation in conservatism?   Can the apparent time 
series variation in conservatism in US accounting, observed in section 4, be explained by 
variation in these factors?  The interaction of standards and practice could be investigated 
using conservatism as well.  Is conservatism due more to how accounting is practiced 
rather than to the accounting standards enacted?     Different factors suggest conservatism 
                                                 
15 There are various forces that might encourage that outcome.  For example, with the demise of 
professional accounting options in leading graduate business schools accounting faculty in those schools 
have increasingly become involved in teaching valuation.   It would not be surprising if faculty members 
tended to adopt  the view that what they teach is central to accounting.  
7:57 AM                     10/6/2000                                                   59 
 
 
could be more prevalent in some areas of financial reporting than in others.  For example, 
the contracting and tax arguments in section 4 suggest conservatism might play a more 
important role in financial statement recognition than in disclosure.  This suggests a study 
of the relative conservatism of recognized versus disclosed elements of financial 
reporting. 
Sections 3 and 4 raise other potential research topics involving non-equity valuation 
roles and other forces affecting accounting and standard setting.  Consider non-equity 
investors (e.g., lenders).  What types of accounting information are more relevant for 
those investors than for equity investors?  Some of those issues have been partially 
investigated in the context of examining typical debt contracts (e.g., Leftwich, 1983) and 
a start has been made on using accounting information to estimate the abandonment 
option (e.g.,  Berger and Ofek, 1996).  Is the form and content of the balance sheet 
largely driven by the demands of these investors as opposed to equity investors?  If so, 
how appropriate is the balance sheet valuation model, as currently implemented, for 
equity valuation? 
Verifiability is also a potentially fruitful research topic.  How does verifiability restrict 
the opportunity set of potential standards?  An examination of FASB considerations on 
verifiability might provide insights into this question.   
The influence of the political process on standard setting could also be studied further. 
For example, can the Leftwich (1995) study on the FASB’s agenda setting be extended?  
Is there any direct evidence that the balance sheet became less useful after the SEC 
eliminated asset write-ups.  Also, could one have predicted the political upheavals 
associated with the proposed opinion on employee stock options and the hedging and 
derivatives project (see Foster, 1998)? Under what circumstances do the SEC and 
Congress become entangled in the standard-setting process?  Is it predictable?  How do 
the FASB’s votes on issues reflect the political process of standard setting?    
While we have concentrated on standard setting implications of this literature, many 
value relevance studies have an objective beyond providing information for standard 
setters.  In particular, they seek to assess the usefulness of accounting numbers in equity 
valuation.  For example, a question addressed in Barth (1994) is whether fair value 
disclosures of investment securities can be used to help determine the market value of 
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banks’ equity securities conditional on the other information included in the model’s 
specifications.  This is a pure valuation question.   While we have not assessed the overall 
contribution of the value relevance literature to valuation, many issues we raise in this 
paper are important for that assessment and for the general valuation literature as well.   
Contributions to the valuation literature depend on the appropriateness of the valuation 
models used and the links from the accounting measures to the models (see section 5), as 
well as the set of conditioning variables (if any) used in the tests.  If the conditioning 
variables are limited in scope, the findings are likely to be less informative.  
In section 5 we discuss weaknesses in the current valuation models used in 
accounting research.  In particular, most of the models estimated assume away the 
existence of economic rents, growth and abandonment options.  In addition, most of the 
estimated models are linear, when there is both ample theory and empirical evidence to 
support the notion that the relation between the variables in the models and value are 
non-linear.  Thus, another area for future research is to advance the valuation models 
used in the literature, by explicitly considering rents, growth and abandonment options 
and the resulting non-linear relations.  Again, this is an area where some research is 
taking place, but there is a surprising reliance on the models highlighted in this review, 
given those models’ weaknesses.   
As we have indicated, an important impediment keeping the value relevance literature 
from contributing more to standard setting debates is its lack of a theory that has some 
potential to explain accounting and standard setting.   As we have seen, assuming 
accounting involves direct valuation of equity has very little current ability or potential to 
provide that explanation.   Assuming that accounting provides information on inputs to 
equity and other securities valuation models could, when combined with the other roles 
of accounting, yield results.  It will require more than just an assumption that accounting 
numbers provide inputs, links between the accounting numbers and valuation models will 
have to be specified in a way that provides testable implications about accounting.  That 
in turn will require an assumption that information (like contracting) is costly and some 
way of predicting the information costs and benefits of alternative accounting regimes.    
Development and refinement of a descriptive theory of accounting and standard 
setting will have important implications not only for standard setting but also for the 
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accounting valuation literature.16  As an example consider the relation between 
accounting earnings and stock prices.   It seems plausible that an accounting theory might 
predict that the accounting earnings of firms with higher risk and growth measure future 
cash flows with greater error and bias (see Skinner, 1993, for a contracting explanation of 
this type or relation).  One reason could be that the contracting use of accounting requires 
verification so accounting earnings do not fully capture growth in firms’ future cash 
flows.  The extent to which current earnings capture future cash flows is likely to be 
smaller for riskier and higher growth firms.17  If, for convenience in explanation, we 
assume the measurement errors in a cross-sectional regression of returns on earnings or 
changes in earnings are distributed independently of one another and of cash flows, then 
the coefficients of the earnings variable will incorporate larger downward biases for 
riskier and higher growth firms.  Absent adjustment for this cross-sectional relation 
implied by accounting theory, the researcher investigating the valuation of accounting 
earnings could reach incorrect conclusions about the relation between risk and growth 
and other factors affecting the earnings response coefficient (e.g., the required or market 
rate of return).  
Another example of how accounting theory can impact estimation of value and 
earnings/value relations comes from the firm’s contractual arrangements with various 
claimholders.  Core and Schrand (1999) provide theory and evidence for why the relation 
between earnings and stock prices will be non-linear as a function of debt indentures that 
provide the debtholder the right to liquidate the firm.  Thus, a non-linearity in the 
earnings stock price relation is induced by the underlying contracts.  This example 
suggests additional research that examines how the non-valuation roles of accounting 
(such as contracting) affect the relations between values and accounting measures is 
warranted. 
                                                 
16 Consistency between accounting theory based on information costs and the valuation model would 
require valuation models that incorporate the information costs.  Given approximate market efficiency the 
inclusion of information costs is likely to be less important in the valuation model than in the accounting 
model. 
17 Notice here that we are putting structure on measurement errors just as Barth (1991 and 1994) puts 
structure on measurement errors. The difference is that we are offering a testable theory as to why that 
measurement error arises.  And, that theory suggests accounting standards are not modified to reduce that 
error. 
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The above illustrations of the importance of a descriptive theory of accounting 
and standard setting to assist standard setters and to the earnings valuation literature 
demonstrates how such a descriptive theory can help reconcile the two literatures.18   It 
also reinforces our point that one cannot use the valuation literature alone to derive 
standard setting implications.  Given the importance of a descriptive theory of 
accounting, we encourage the academic community to begin devoting more resources to 
the types of questions we suggest in this section.  In order to advance the accounting 
literature on multiple fronts and increase the relevance of our research, we must consider 
all the forces roles that affect the form and content of accounting. 
                                                 
18 See Watts (1992) for discussion of the implications of a descriptive accounting theory for capital markets 
research, including valuation. 
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Table 2
Comparison of conservatism of US income numbers over time
by reporting regime,1927-1993
Average coefficients from yearly cross-sectional regressions of earnings on contemporaneous returns for different reporting regimes (Ely & Waymire Data), 
coefficients from pooled cross-sectional regressions of earnings on contemporaneous returns with dummies for different reporting regimes (Basu, 1997), 
coefficients from pooled cross-sectional regressions of earnings on contemporaneous returns (Ball, Kothari & Robin, 1999)
Xt/Pt-1 = a0 + a1DRt + b0Rt+ b1DRtRt
EARNINGS REGRESSION OPERATING EARNINGS REGRESSION
Mean coefficient of Mean coefficient of
Loss Dummy* Loss Dummy*
Dummy Return Return Dummy Return Return
a1 b0 b1 a1 b0 b1
Conservatism Conservatism
ELY & WAYMIRE DATA
Average of individual year regressions
Subperiod  Reporting regime
1927-41 Prestandard-setting, low litigation 0.00 0.11** 0.09* -0.09 0.15** -0.09
(0.48) (5.57) (2.24) (-.93) (5.37) (-1.29)
1942-46 Price controls, standard-setting, low litigation 0.07 0.60** -0.32 0.07 2.29** -1.53
(1.28) (8.16) (-.98) (0.04) (5.69) (-1.05)
1947-50 Standard-setting, low litigation 0.03 0.33** 0.01 0.05 0.71** -0.16
(1.39) (6.54) (0.10) (1.30) (6.36) (-0.55)
1951-53 Price controls, standard-setting, low litigation 0.03 0.22** 0.07 0.09 0.49** 0.05
(2.24) (5.38) (1.66) (1.89) (5.64) (-0.55)
1954-66 Standard-setting, low litigation 0.00 0.08** 0.06* 0.01 0.18** 0.08*
(0.51) (6.78) (2.61) (1.34) (6.52) (2.30)
1967-75 Standard-setting, high litigation 0.03* 0.11** 0.05** -0.02 0.08** 0.08*
(2.13) (5.58) (3.62) (1.43) (3.39) (2.42)
1976-82 Standard-setting, litigation 0.03* 0.14** 0.16** 0.06 0.26 0.02
(2.13) (6.49) (3.40) (0.68) (0.06) (1.59)
1983-93 Standard-setting, high litigation 0.02 0.00 0.43** 0.03* 0.08** 0.32**
(0.89) (0.63) (7.47) (2.30) (3.19) (5.32)
1963-66 Standard-setting, low litigation 0.00 .06** 0.04 0.03 0.19* 0.09
(0.73) (4.67) (1.34) (1.38) (3.62) (1.78)
Full period
1927-93 .02** 0.14** 0.10** 0.00 0.36** -0.06
(3.44) (14.99) (7.77) (2.85) (13.87) (3.45)
BASU (1997)
Pooled cross-sectional regressions with regime dummies
1963-66 Standard-setting, low litigation 0.00 0.03** 0.01
(0.01) (4.74) (0.93)
1967-75 Standard-setting, high litigation 0.02 0.07 0.19
1976-82 Standard-setting, litigation -0.01 0.03 0.19
1983-90 Standard-setting, high litigation 0.03 0.03 0.40
EARNINGS BEFORE EXTRAORDINARY ITEMS
BALL,KOTHAR & ROBIN (1999)
Pooled cross-sectional regressions
 1985-90 Standard-setting, high litigation ? 0.03** 0.29**
(6.14) (26.79)
1991-95 Standard-setting, high litigation ? 0.03** 0.33**
(6.54) (22.14)
t-statistics in parentheses.  For the Ely & Waymire data the t-statistics are for the mean coefficient.  No t-statistics are available for the last three Basu periods 
   because the coefficients are obtained from aggregating reported coefficients.
Ely & Waymire Data.  Sample of  100 firms drawn randomly each year in the period 1927-1993 that met two criteria: I) stock price data available from CRSP Monthly 
   Price File for 29 months from February of the prior year through June of the subsequent year; and 2) four-digit SIC code between 1000 and 3999.  Earnings are from  
   Compustat or Moody's Industrial Manuals.  Earnings data are not available for 30 of the 6700 firm years and those observations are not replaced.  As a result the 
   yearly number of observations varies from 97-100 with most of the missing data occurring pre-1951.
Basu's sample consists of 43,321 firm year observations from 1963-1990.  Basu estimates a pooled regression with dummies for the additional effects in various 
  subperiods.  We aggregate the coefficients to produce  coefficients comparable to the Ely & Waymire data regressions.
The Ball, Kothari & Robin samples include 11,978 firm years for the 1985-90 period and 9,247 for the 1991-95 period.  They estimate pooled regressions.
Xt  is the firm earnings per share for year t, Pt-1 is the price at the beginning of year t,   For the Basu data earnings are adjusted for market earnings.  
   Earnings is before extraordinary items for Ball, Kothari & Robin
DRt  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if Rt <0 and zero otherwise. 
Rt is the rate of return on the firm stock for year t.  Ely & Waymire measure the return over 16 months, fiscal year plus four months. ; Basu measures the return over
   the 12 months beginning month four of fiscal year and adjusts for the market return;  Ball, Kothari and Robin measure the return over the fiscal year  
The test for conservatism is whether the slope coefficient for the last term is significantly positive.
